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STATE LIMITED AND PRIVATE OFFERING
EXEMPTIONS: THE MARYLAND EXPERIENCE IN
A NATIONAL PERSPECTIVE
Mark A. Sargentt

A limited or private offering of securities exemptedfrom federal
registration still may ~have to be registered in one or more states,
because the state exemptions for these transactions are often different from the available federal exemptions. These differences,
however, do not reflect a principled allocation of regulatory responsibilities between the Securities and Exchange Commission
and the state securities administrators, but rather derive from
historical, philosophical, and structural differences between the
federal and state securities laws. Recent reforms of the federal
exemptive..szstem have produced new concern about the impact
of these d!JJerences on the capital formation process, and have
fed to a reevaluation of the goals of state limited and private
offering exemptions. Reevaluation of the exemptive scheme
under the Maryland Securities Act in fight ofthese developments
has resulted in both statutory amendment and adoPtion~ two
new exemptive rules. The author, who was one of the dra tsmen
of these rules, explores their relation to the national an Maryfand experience with state limited and private offering exemptions, and examines many of the noveljUestions ofpolicy and
practice generated by the new Marylan rules.
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INTRODUCTION

Federal securities law provides several exemptions from registration for private and limited offerings of securities. Limited offerings
are exempted primarily because of the small size of the offering. Private offerings are exempted because the relationship between the issuer
and purchaser of securities makes registration unnecessary. State securities laws traditionally have also permitted some exemption of limited and private offerings, but to widely varying degrees. These state
exemptions are rapidly being transformed. The new exemptive rules
under the Maryland Securities Act are no exception; indeed, they are
among the most novel of the new state exemptions.
This article will describe those rules, explain how they are intended to operate, and analyze the many questions of policy they present. It will not confine itself, however, to an analysis of Maryland law.
Instead, it will also show why the new Maryland exemptive rules must
be viewed in light of the national experience that influenced their development. These rules must be viewed in that perspective because
they were not drafted in a vacuum: they were drafted with an acute
awareness of the long standing problems encountered by practitioners
trying to structure offerings under state limited and private offering exemptions. They were also drafted with an understanding of how recent
reforms of the federal exemptive system demonstrated the need for
change in the state approach and created new possibilities for reform of
the state exemptions. Accordingly, Section II of this article examines
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the traditional problems associated with most state limited and private
offering exemptions. Section III then describes how pressures for
change in the state approach to limited and private offerings have increased as a result of the recent reform of the federal exemptive system,
leading to substantial reform both nationally and in Maryland. Sections II and III thus provide the context in which the purpose and functioning of the new Maryland rules must be understood.
The new Maryland rules were also drafted with an awareness of
the historical traditions of Maryland securities law. That law has always reflected a commitment to coordination of state and federal securities law and to the elimination of duplicative or needlessly inconsistent
state regulation. This commitment was expressed in Maryland's 1961
adoption of a revised Uniform Securities Act (Uniform Act) and in the
exemptive rules adopted by the Maryland Securities Division in the
1970's. It is also expressed in the new Maryland exemptive rules discussed in this article, since the changes brought about by those rules
represent new ways of achieving federal-state coordination. In sum,
the recent changes in the Maryland exemptions express an essential
continuity within Maryland securities law. Section IV of this article
examines this pattern of continuity and change in Maryland securities
law and provides a historical introduction to Section V's analysis of the
current exemptive system.
The current Maryland exemptive system is an outgrowth of two
1981 amendments to the exemptive provisions of the Maryland Securities Act. Those amendments required the Securities Division to develop administrative rules to implement the new exemptions. Section
V of this article explores the nature and effects of the 1981 amendments, identifies the goals of the ru1emaking process that followed, defines the functional relationship of the rules developed in that process,
and finally analyzes in detail the rules themselves.
II.

STATE EXEMPTIONS: THE TRADITIONAL DIFFICULTY

The exemptions from state securities registration have always had
a motley air. The problem is essentially structural: the exemptions
were originally little more than grudging exceptions to the basic statutory presumption that every securities transaction is subject to registration. I While broad exemptions inevitably have developed, the blue sky
l. This presumption was the legacy of the pre-World War I development of the blue
sky laws as highly paternalistic and comprehensive schemes of licensing securities
transactions. See L. Loss & E. COWETT, BLUE SKY LAW 3-10 (1958); J. MOFSKY,
BLUE SKY RESTRICTIONS ON NEW BUSINESS PROMOTIONS 11, 12 (1971). The first
blue sky law, adopted by Kansas in 1911, reflected this presumption by exempting
from registration only United States bonds, Kansas state and municipal bonds,
and notes secured by mortgages on real estate located in Kansas. 1911 Kan. Sess.
Laws 133, § l. For contemporary discussion of this statute, see Dolley, The Kansas "Blue Sky" Law, 75 CENT. L.J. 221 (1912); Mulvey, Blue Sky Law, 36 CAN. L.
TIMES 37 (1916). The blue sky exemptions have become considerably more thor-
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exemptive system does not represent a systematic harmonization of the
need for investor protection, the necessity to reduce compliance costs,
and the principles of federalism. It is, instead, a crazy quilt of practical
solutions and political compromises. 2 This approach is not necessarily
objectionable, however, since it seems to work, at least sometimes.
A good example of how this patchwork system seems to work is
the blue sky treatment of secondary transactions. Although it is difficult to define precisely the nature of the states' interest in the regulation
of secondary transactions, 3 and although there is no blue sky
equivalent of the federal concept of statutory underwriter,4 the combined effect of several aspects of the blue sky law does seem to constitute workable regulation. Those aspects include class registration (the
device by which all securities of the same class covered by a registration statement are deemed registered),5 the isolated non-issuer,6 manuaF and unsolicited broker-dealers transactional exemptions, and the
exchange-listed,9 blue chip,IO and National Association of Securities

2.

3.

4.
5.

6.
7.
8.
9.

ough and complex than they were in 1911, but the idea of exemption from securities registration is still somewhat at odds with the premises of these statutes.
An example is the early effort by the Investment Bankers Association (IBA) to
establish a variety of exemptions from state securities registration, such as the
exemption for exchange-listed securities. For a discussion on the activities of the
IBA, see C. COWINGS, POPULISTS, PLUNGERS AND PROGRESSIVES 69 (1965); M.
PARRISH, SECURITIES REGULATION AND THE NEW DEAL 7-20 (1970). As one
commentator noted, however, "[e]xpediency was the main propellant of [IBA]
policy." Id. at 9. Since the IBA's real concern was for the issues underwritten by
its members-the major investment banking houses-it did not propose or support a coherent system of exemptions responsive to the needs of small as well as
large issuers. J. MOFSKY, supra note 1, at 12.
As the draftsman of the Uniform Act observed: "Perhaps the most difficult aspect
of the area of securities registration. . . is the application of the registration provisions to secondary distributions or other transactions not involving the issuer of
the security." L. Loss, COMMENTARY ON THE UNIFORM SECURITIES ACT 72
(1976). The problem is more than one of application. Recent studies of the efficient market hypothesis have questioned whether the states have a significant interest in regulating either primary or secondary distributions by widely-followed
issuers. See Mofsky, Reform of the Florida Securities Laws, 2 FLA. ST. U.L. REV.
I, 22-23 (1974); Mofsky & Tollison, Demerit in Merit Regulation, 60 MARQ. L.
REv. 367, 368-69 (1977); Walker & Hadaway, Merit Standards Revisited' An Empirical Analysis tifthe Efficiency of Texas Merit Standards, 7 J. CORP. L. 651, 65859 (1982).
See Securities Act of 1933 § 2(11), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(ll) (1982).
Compare UNIF. SEC. ACT § 305(i), 7A U.L.A. 614-15 (1956) (all outstanding securities of the same class as a registered security are considered to be registered for
the purpose of any non-issuer transaction) with MD. CORPS. & ASS'NS CODE ANN.
§ 11-508(a) (1975) (omits language in § 305(i) providing for class registration).
The class registration language had been included in the originally adopted version of the Uniform Act. See 1962 Md. Laws I, codified at MD. ANN. CODE art.
32A, § 23(f) (repealed and recodified at MD. CORPS. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. § 11508(a) (1975».
UNIF. SEC. ACT. § 402(b)(1), 7A U.L.A. 640 (1956).
Id. § 402(b)(2).
Id § 402(b)(3).
Id § 402(a)(8), 7A U.L.A. at 639.
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Dealers Automated Quotations (NASDAQ) I I secuntIes exemptions.
Judicious use of one or more of these devices will ordinarily allow the
free flow of securities in the secondary markets.
There is growing criticism of some aspects of this "system" from
both the regulators l2 and representatives of the securities industry, 13
but it has not generated the kind of trouble produced by the state exemptions for issuer offerings involving private transactions, small numbers of offerees or purchasers, a limited aggregate offering price, or
smaller issuers.14 The past and present difficulty in this area has produced a renewed cry that the blue sky exemptive system does not work,
and that some degree of federal preemption may be needed. 15 It
10. There is no blue chip exemption in the Uniform Act. These exemptions allow
seasoned issuers that meet specified criteria of duration and stability to avoid registration of their public offerings. For a discussion of the policy and definitional
issues associated with this exemption, see authorities cited infra note 13. For an
example of this type of exemption, see New Mexico's version of the exemption.
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 58-13-29 F (1983).
II. There is no exemption in the Uniform Act for securities traded pursuant to the
NASDAQ system. For an example of this type of exemption, see MD. CORPS. &
ASS'NS CODE ANN. § 11-601(12) (Supp. 1984).
12. A committee of the North American Securities Administrators Association
(NASAA) is currently examining the securities industry'S use of the manual and
unsolicited broker-dealer transactional exemptions to circumvent state merit regulation of primary offerings. The problem identified by NASAA is the use of these
exemptions to release securities into the secondary markets of states in which the
issuer did not or would not meet the merit criteria applicable to the primary
offering.
13. Representatives of the bar and the industry self-regulatory organization (SRO)
have urged broader state adoption of securities exemptions based on either blue
chip criteria or Federal Reserve Board Margin List status. See, e.g., Letter of
Robert M. Royalty & Robert R. Grew to Conrad G. Goodkind (Sept. 10, 1976)
(letter from members of the State Regulation of Securities Committee of the
American Bar Association (ABA) Section on Corporation, Banking and Business
Law, urging Uniform Act adoption of a blue chip exemption) (copy on file at the
University of Baltimore Law Review office); Letter of Dennis C. Hensley to Robert C. Guiod (Mar. 31, 1982) (letter from Vice President of Corporate Financing
of the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. (NASD), urging state adoption of an exemption based on Federal Reserve Board Margin List status) (copy
on file at the University of Baltimore Law Review office).
14. For descriptions of the persistent difficulty in this area, see J. MOFSK Y, supra note
I, at 19-30; Garcia & Kantor, Dark Clouds in a Blue Sky: An Analysis of the
Limited Offering Exemption, 23 U. MIAMI L. REV. 568 (1969); Royalty & Jones,
The Private Placement Exemption and the Blue Sky Laws-Shoals in the Safe Harbor, 33 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 877 (1976); Halloran & Linderman, Coordinating
State Securities Laws with Regulation D and Federal Integration Policy: State Limited Offering Exemptions and Integration Standards, STATE REGULATION OF CAPITAL FORMATION AND SECURITIES TRANSACTIONS 155 (D. Goldwasser & H.
Makens eds. 1983).
15. An indication of the renewed interest in the preemption question was a panel
discussion on that topic held at the 1983 NASAA Annual Meeting. See NASAA
Adopts ULOE, Endorses Uniformity, Focuses on Threats to Merit Regulation, 15
SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 1833, 1836-37 (1983). The Securities Industry Association (SIA) recently urged consideration of the possibility of federal preemption.
See Myriad of Approaches to Uniformity of State Regulation Urged at Hearing, 15
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should be emphasized, however, that there is no single "difficulty" in
this area, but a complex set of interlocking problems with sources
deeply rooted in the overlapping state and federal regulatory schemes.
A.

The Problems

There are three basic problems in this area of state exemption.
First, state securities acts have traditionally de-emphasized the role of
exemptions based on the private or limited character of the offering.
For example, the Uniform Act provides an exemption for "offerings to
a limited number of persons," provided that the offer is directed to not
more than ten persons within a twelve-month period,and no commission or other remuneration is paid in connection with the sales effort. 16
While the Securities and Exchange Commission's (SEC) adoption of
Regulation D has accelerated a preexisting trend toward broader federal exemptions,11 section 402(b)(9) of the Uniform Act reflects the blue
sky law's traditionally restrictive approach to this type of exemption. 18
Second, the lack of uniformity among the states has been, and to
some extent still is, extreme. The draftsman's commentary to section
402(b)(9) described the statutes in this area as being "sharply and irreconcilably Split."19 Later commentators have made similar observations.20 Counsel for issuers attempting to blue sky an exempt
transaction thus have had to contend with a broad variety of bases and
conditions for exemption.
Third, there has been a substantial lack of coordination between
the federal and state exemptions. A transaction exempt at the federal
level is not by definition exempt at the state level; the issuer has to find
a separate state exemption. This basic fact has created practical difficulties, because the states have tended to take a more restrictive approach to exemptions than Congress and the SEC, and because state-

16.
17.
18.

19.
20.

SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 1737, 1738 (1983). The current conflict among
NASAA, some states, and bar representatives over the proper degree of coordination between Regulation D and state exemptions has produced particular interest
in the possibility of preemption. See Statement of Michael J. Halloran, special
counsel to the National Venture Capital Association, to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and NASAA in Connection with Public Hearings
under Section 19(c) of the Securities Act of 1933, at 9 (Sept. 12, 1983) (copy on file
at the University of Baltimore Law Review office).
UNIF. SEC. ACT § 402(b)(9), 7A U.LA 641 (1956).
See infra note 159 (discussing development of broader state limited and private
offering exemption).
For evidence of the persistence of this approach, see L. Loss, supra note 3, at 12530 (describing the state of the law in 1956); Mofsky, State Securities Regulation
and New Promotions: A Case History, 15 WAYNE L. REV. 1401, 1405-10, 1415
(1969); Note, State Exemptions from Securities Regulation Coextensive with SEC
Rule 146, 61 CORNELL L. REV. 157, 162, 166-67 (1975).
See L. Loss, supra note 3, at 125.
See, e.g., Halloran & Linderman, supra note 14, at 157; Royalty & Jones, supra
note 14, at 878; Shapiro & Sachs, Blue Sky Law and Practice: An Overview, 4 U.
BALT. L. REV. 1, 17-18 (1974).
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to-state uniformity has been lacking. Accordingly, counsel for issuers
who have structured a transaction to comply with a state of the art
federal exemption may still have to comply with inconsistent or at least
additional exemptive criteria imposed by every state in which the offering is made. 21 The net result may be that the state with the "toughest"
exemptive conditions determines the structure of the transaction, or
that the offering is registered in some states and exempted in others.
That latter result may be unfortunate from the issuer's standpoint, since
it may be crucial to avoid the delay and expense incident to state registration by qualification.

B.

Their Sources

These problems have several sources. To some extent, the difficulty is conceptual. State securities acts lack a unified theory of why
private or limited offerings should be exempted. This results in part
from the absence of state parallels to the federal law concepts of "distribution," "public offering," and "non-public offering," essential to the
section 4(2) exemption of the Securities Act of 1933 (the 1933 Act).22
The problems also result from widespread disagreement and uncertainty over whether the state exemption should depend on one or
more of the following factors: 23 (1) the number and nature of the purchasers; (2) the number and nature of the offerees; (3) the issuer's size,
character, or locus of organization; (4) the size of the offering; (5) the
manner of the offering; (6) the "isolated" nature of the sales; (7) the use
of a disclosure document; or (8) some degree of pre-commencement
administrative review of the offering.24 This conceptual uncertainty
21. For an explanation of the jurisdictional premises of the state securities acts, see L.
Loss, supra note 3, at 158 (official comment to section 414 of the Uniform Act);
see also Long, The Conflict of Laws Provisions of the Uniform Securities Act, or
When Does a Transaction "Take Place in this State?", 31 OKLA. L. REV. 781
(1978) (detailed consideration of blue sky jurisdictional questions).
22. Securities Act of 1933 § 4(2), IS U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1982).
23. For example, the complex Pennsylvania exemption contains the following limitations, requirements, and obligations: (1) specific numerical limits on both the
number of offerees and the number of purchasers; (2) mandatory filing of the
offering document as well as the notice of sales; (3) the seller and purchaser must
execute a special agreement imposing certain restrictions on resale; and (4) the
issuer is under an affirmative obligation to amend the notice filing to reflect any
material changes during the period of the offering. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 1203(d)-(e) (Purdon Supp. 1983); PA. ADMIN. CODE § 203.041, reprinted in 2 BLUE
SKY L. REP. (CCH) ~ 48,435 (Apr. 1981).
Unexpected problems were also caused by one state's former requirement of
reporting sales in connection with exempt transactions. See Fein & Bright, Private
Offerings of Securities Under the Illinois Securities Law--Judicial Changes and the
Needfor Further Amendment, 31 DE PAUL L. REV. 307, 315-17 (1982). If the filing
of the report of sales is a strictly enforced condition of the exemption, the small
business issuer relying upon a nonspecialist attorney may violate the registration
requirement because of the failure to make a simple notice filing.
24. The Massachusetts Securities Division currently requires substantive merit review
of offerings to be exempted under the limited offering exemption of the Massachu-
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has inhibited the development of state-to-state uniformity and has prevented true federal-state coordination. The lack of a state parallel to
the federal "non-public offering" exemption of section 4(2) of the 1933
Ace5 and the associated "safe harbor" provisions of Federal Rules
14626 and 506 27 has created serious problems for the many issuers engaged in federal "private placements" under section 4(2) and its implementing rules. 28 The confusion created by the lack of a common
theoretical basis for exemption were exacerbated by the states' reliance
on exemptive conditions foreign to federal law, such as restrictions on
sales remuneration,29 pre-commencement administrative review,30 and
the domestic status of the issuer.3l
The difficulty may also reflect certain preconceptions about the allocation of regulatory responsibilities. A state administrator may argue, for example, that certain exemptions from federal registration
represent nothing less than a deferral to state regulation. If that is the
case, then a matching exemption at the state level is inappropriate, and
state registration should be required. The SEC has on more than one
occasion used this kind of reasoning32 to justify particular exemptions,
such as Rule 147' s33 safe harbor for the 1933 Act's section 3(a)(11)34

25.
26.
27.
28.

29.
30.
31.

32.

33.
34.

setts Uniform Securities Act. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. I lOA, § 402(b)(9) (West
Supp. 1983); see I MASS. SEC. BULL. 115 (July 1980) ("[t]he granting of a
§ 402(b)(9) exemption requires an active response from the Division; a thorough,
intensive review of every offering conducted within the statutory time limit defined under the Section").
Securities Act of 1933 § 4(2), 15 U.S.c. § 77d(2) (1982).
17 C.F.R. § 230.146 (1981) (rescinded 1982).
ld. § 230.506 (1983).
These observations are not intended to suggest that the SEC's and the federal
judiciary's approach to the 1933 Act exemptions has been a model of clarity or
balanced policymaking. In fact, an opposite conclusion may be more accurate,
and it is fair to say that the problems with federal-state coordination reflect the
inadequacies of federal exemptive law and policy as well as those of the state
securities acts. It remains true, however, that the 1933 Act's concept of nonpublic
offerings lacks a conceptual parallel in state law, and that has been a major problem. For descriptions of this problem and how the Maryland Securities Division
attempted to resolve it through the adoption of Rule S-7 (MD. ADMIN. CODE tit.
02, § .02.03.07 (rescinded 1983)), see Md. Sec. Act Release No.5, reprinted in I
BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) ~ 15,553 (Sept. 28, 1972); Notes & Comments, Maryland Blue Sky Reform: One State's Experiment with the Private Offering Exemption, 32 MD. L. REV. 273 (1972); Note, supra note 18, at 168-70.
See UNIF. SEC. ACT § 402(b)(9), 7A U.L.A. 641 (1956) (limited offering exemption prohibits remuneration for sales efforts).
See supra note 23.
This approach is no longer prevalent. See L. Loss, supra note 3, at 127 (discussing
Pennsylvania's former reliance on domestic incorporation as a condition to exemption). Domestic organization or location of the issuer may still play, however,
a limited role in a state exemption. See MD. ADMIN. CODE tit. 02, § .02.04.09C
(1983) (the "Local Issuer Exemption" under Maryland Regulation 9).
See Securities Act Release No. 5450, reprinted in [1973-1974 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) ~ 79,617 (Jan. 7, 1974).
17 C.F.R. § 230.147 (1983).
Securities Act of 1933 § 3(a)(1l), 15 U.S.c. § 77c(a)(1l) (1976).
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intrastate offering exemption, and Regulation D's Rule 50435 limited
offering exemption. 36 The traditionally restrictive approach to state exemptions, however, may reflect a belief on the part of some state administrators that other federal exemptions also represent a deferral to
rigorous state regulation.
Finally, the state securities administrators' attitude toward these
kinds of exemptions may have been shaped by their historical experience as frontline combatants against fraud in relatively small, localized
securities offerings. 37 While it is difficult to quantify levels and types of
enforcement activity over long periods of time in fifty jurisdictions,38 it
may be fair to assume that the state securities administrators have a
perspective on abusive practices in exempt transactions that the SEC
may lack.
Whatever their sources, the problems with narrow, nonuniform,
and uncoordinated state exemptions for limited and private offerings
have frustrated securities practitioners for many years. The pressure
for change in the states' approach to these transactions, furthermore,
has increased because reform of the federal exemptive system has made
capital financing through exempt offerings more useful and important.
As these transactions have become more important, the limitations imposed by the state exemptions have produced greater costs, greater delays, and greater frustration. In response to these developments, some
progress has been made nationally toward reform of the state exemptions. 39 Reform of the federal scheme was the condition precedent to
35. 17 C.F.R. § 230.504 (1983).
36. See Securities Act Release No. 6389, [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REp. (CCH) ~ 83,106 (Mar. 8, 1982); Securities Act Release No. 6339, reprinted in
[1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) ~ 83,014 (Aug. 7, 1981).
37. Long, State Securities Regulation-An Overview, 32 OKLA. L. REV. 541-45 (1979)
(discussing state enforcement activities). For a journalistic account of some recent
state enforcement activities, see Welling, Tough Securities Corp., BARRONS, Feb.
I, 1982, at 8 (interview with Tom Krebs, former Director of the Alabama Securities Division). A notable example of interstate cooperation in enforcement matters is the Leviticus Project, a formally structured multistate investigation of a
variety of crimes involving the coal industry. See Letter of Mark N. Cohen, Director of Enforcement, Pennsylvania Securities Commission, to Mark A. Sargent
(Dec. 21, 1982) (copy on file at the University of Baltimore Law Review office).
38. Some data have been collected, but they are quite general, and provide no real
basis for historical comparisons or comparisons of federal-state activities. See
Empirical Research Project-Blue Sky Laws and State Takeover Statutes: New
Importancefor an Old Battleground, 7 J. CORP. L. 689,797-800 (1982) (survey of
percentage of office time devoted by state securities administrations to enforcement matters) [hereinafter cited as Empirical Research Project].
39. The use of the term "progress" to describe the recent developments in the exemptive area refiects, of course, the author's bias. Others regard the "liberalization" of
the federal and state transactional exemptions as an unjustifiable threat to the
needs of investor protection. E.g., Memorandum of NASAA Enforcement Liaison Committee to NASAA Small Business Finance Committee 3, Apr. 19, 1983
("Questionable tax shelter deals have been proliferating. . . . The encouragement of these offerings through unlimited sales and without full disclosure is
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reform of the state exemptions; the purposes and scope of the federal
reform thus need to be understood.
III.

PRESSURES FOR CHANGE AND THE REFORM OF THE
FEDERAL EXEMPTIVE SCHEME

The reform of the federal approach to registration exemptions developed slowly. This reform has taken more than a decade, and has
reflected not only the interests of small business issuers, but also the
SEC's and the securities bar's interest in developing more efficient and
less costly exemptive mechanisms. The main directions of this reform
movement were the reduction of compliance costs (particularly for
small business issuers) and the elimination of exemptive conditions that
did not significantly protect investors, such as offeree suitability
requirements.
The first important catalyst of reform was the Wheat Report of
1969.40 This report was the product of an internal study group formed
by the SEC "to examine the operations of the disclosure provisions of
the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and
the Commission rules and regulations thereunder."41 Although most
of the report's recommendations concerned problems of disclosure in
federally registered offerings, it also identified what the drafters described as the "grave shortcomings" of the then current approach to the
nonpublic offering exemption of section 4(2).42 This description quite
accurately reflected the tendencies of federal courts to adopt the SEC's
narrow construction of the exemption43 and to grant recovery to purchasers by denying the availability of the exemption. 44 In essence, the
Wheat Report identified the conceptual and practical problems that led
other commentators to suggest that the SEC was seriously undermining, if not destroying, the practical utility of the exemption. 45

40.
41.
42.
43.

44.

45.

counter to every state securities law concept whether the state has merit or full
disclosure standards.") [hereinafter cited as NASAA Memorandum].
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, DISCLOSURE TO INVESTORS: A REAPPRAISAL OF FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE POLICIES UNDER THE '33 AND '34 ACTS
(1969) [hereinafter cited as DISCLOSURE TO INVESTORS].
Id. at 3 (quoting Securities Act Release No. 4885 (Nov. 28, 1967».
DISCLOSURE TO INVESTORS, supra note 40, at 155-57.
See SEC v. Continental Tobacco Co. of S.c., 463 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1972); United
States v. Custer Channel Wing Corp., 376 F.2d 675 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 389
U.S. 850 (1967). For summaries and analyses of this development, see Brooks,
Small Business Financing Alternatives Under the Securities Act of 1933, 13 V.C.D.
L. REV. 543, 574 (1980); Kripke, Proceedings Wrap-Up, ABA National Institute,
Revolution in Securities Regulation, Bus. LAW. 185, 187 (1974); Parnell, Kohl &
Huff, Private and Limited Offerings After a Decade ofExperimentation: The Evolution of Regulation D, 12 N.M.L. REV. 633, 639-40 (1982).
See Doran v. Petroleum Management Corp., 545 F.2d 893 (5th Cir. 1977); Henderson v. Hayden Stone, Inc., 461 F.2d 1069 (5th Cir. 1972); Hill York Corp. v.
American Int'l Franchises, Inc., 448 F.2d 680 (5th Cir. 1971); Lively v. Hirschfeld,
440 F.2d 631 (10th Cir. 1971); Bryant v. Viand, 327 F. Supp. 439 (S.D. Tex. 1971).
See, e.g., R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, SECURITIES REGULATION 239 (5th ed. 1982);
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The SEC responded to the concerns of the Wheat Report and
other commentators through its 1974 adoption of Rule 146, a safe harbor for the section 4(2) exemption. 46 Rule 146 was "designed to provide more objective standards for determining when offers or sales of
securities by an issuer would be deemed to be transactions not involving any public offering within the meaning of Section 4(2)."47 Many
commentators felt, however, that the rule merely injected more complexity and uncertainty into an already troubled area, and did not provide the kind of relief needed most acutely by small business issuers. 48
The SEC did not ignore this criticism, but attempted to balance
the needs of investors and issuers by shifting its attention to the exemption under section 3(b) of the 1933 Act49 for issues with a limited aggregate offering price. The SEC had long permitted certain smaller issues
of securities to be offered publicly under Regulation A,50 an exemption
adopted by the agency under section 3(b). Regulation A, however, has
always been a complex exemption. In fact, it functions as if it were a
type of short form registration,51 and it generates significant compliance costs for the issuer. 52 Regulation A thus did not exploit section
3(b)'s full potential as an exemption. In particular, Regulation A was
not tailored to the needs of small business issuers and offered them
little relief from the burdens of registration. The SEC tried to respond
to this problem in 1975 by adopting Rule 240,53 an exemption specifically designed to provide exemptive relief for the small business issuer. 54 Rule 240, however, was not extensive; it merely offered an

46.
47.

48.
49.
50.
51.

52.
53.
54.

Coles, Has Securities Regulation in the Private Capital Markets Become a f)eterrent
to Capital Growth? A Critical Review, 58 MARQ. L. REV. 395, 436-37 (1975);
Kripke, supra note 43, at 187.
17 C.F.R. § 230.146 (rescinded 1982).
Securities Act Release No. 33-5487, 1 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) ~ 2710 (Apr. 23,
1974).
E.g., R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, supra note 45, at 248 nn.1-2 (listing articles);
Parnell, Kohl & Huff, supra note 43, at 639 n.44 (same).
Securities Act of 1933 § 3(b), 15 U.S.c. § 77c(b) (1982).
17 C.F.R. § 230.251-264 (1983). The SEC first adopted Regulation A in 1941.
See L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION (TEMPORARY STUDENT EDITION) 609-11
(2d ed. 1961).
17 C.F.R. § 230.255 (1983) requires tiling in an SEC Regional Office of an offering
statement at least 10 days prior to the initial offering of any Regulation A securities. The offering statement receives an SEC staff review similar to that received
by a registration tiled in connection with a registered offering. For a summary of
the similarities and differences between offerings exempted under Regulation A
and registered offerings, see Burge, Regulation A: A Review and Look at Recent
f)evelopments, 46 L.A. BAR J. 290, 291 (1971). One important difference is that
section 11 liability does not apply to Regulation A offerings, because Regulation
A is an exemption. Securities Act of 1933 § 11(a), 15 U.S.c. § 77k(a) (1982); see
also L. Loss, supra note 50, at 611 (although Regulation A is an exemption, it
functions as a form of simplified registration).
Brooks, supra note 43, at 565-66.
17 C.F.R. § 230.240 (1981) (rescinded 1982).
Securities Act Release No. 5560, reprinted in [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEC. L. REp. (CCH) ~ 80,066, at 84,945 (Jan. 24, 1975).
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issuer having one hundred or fewer beneficial owners an exemption for
sales of securities totaling less than $100,000 for any twelve-month period. Rule 240 thus did not stem the tide of criticism. Although it provided the issuer with a relatively certain safe harbor, critics emphasized
that it imposed unnecessary restraints on small business financing, such
as the limitation on the aggregate offering price to $100,000 and the
prohibition on remuneration of persons engaged in the selling effort. ss
The criticism of Rule 240, when viewed in connection with the
criticism of section 4(2), Rule 146, and Regulation A, reflected frustration with the entire exemptive system, not just with the individual exemptions. Although this frustration was felt by counsel for all types of
issuers, it was felt most acutely by counsel for small business issuers. S6
The special concerns of small business came to the fore in 1977
when the SEC's Advisory Committee on Corporate Disclosure urged
the agency to evaluate the impact of its regulatory scheme on small
business. Accordingly, the SEC began an extensive examination of the
effect of the federal securities laws on small business financing. This
examination began with a series of public hearings held in six cities
across the country.57 After learning that the small business community
did not regard Rules 146 and 240 as particularly helpful,58 the SEC
adopted several significant reforms. First, the aggregate amount of securities that could be offered under Regulation A was increased from
$500,000 to $1,500,000. 59 Second, Regulation A was amended to permit the use of a preliminary offering circular prior to the commencement of the offering. 60 Third, the SEC adopted Form S_18,61 a
55. For critiques of Rule 240, see Carney, Exemptionsfrom Securities Registrationfor
Small Issuers: Sh(/iingfrom Full Disclosure-Part III: The Small Offering Exemption and Rule 240, 11 LAND & WATER L. REV. 483, 493 (1976); Kessler, Private
Placement Rules 146 and 240-Safe Harbor?, 44 FORDHAM L. REV. 37, 78 (1975);
see also Securities Act Release No. 6180, [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC.
L. REP. (CCH) ~ 82,426, at 82,813 (Jan. 17, 1980) (Rule 240 criticisms include its
limited utility and its prohibition against payment of commissions for solicitation
of purchasers); Danner, Snowmass Small Business Securities Conference, 35 Bus.
LAW. 1367, 1371 (1980) (Rule 240 does not provide a practical vehicle for effecting
small offerings).
56. HOUSE COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, 95TH CONG., 1ST
SESS., REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CORPORATE DISCLOSURE TO
THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION 511, 524-46 (Comm. Print 1977)
[hereinafter cited as the SOMMER REPORT]. For a symposium on the SOMMER
REpORT, see Survey: Report of the Advisory Commillee on Corporate Disclosure to
the Securities and Exchange Commission, 26 UCLA L. REV. 48 (1978).
57. These hearings were announced in Securities Act Release No. 5914, [1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) ~ 81,530 (Mar. 6, 1978).
58. See Securities Act Release No. 6180, [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) ~ 82,426, at 82,813 (Jan. 17, 1980).
59. See Securities Act Release No. 5977, [1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REp.
(CCH) ~ 81,710 (Sept. 11, 1978).
60. See 17 C.F.R. § 239.256(h) (1983).
61. Id. § 239.28; Securities Act Release No. 6049, [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) ~ 82,046 (Apr. 3, 1979). In 1983, the ceiling on the aggregate offering
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simplified registration statement for certain smaller issuers going public
for the first time and offering securities with an aggregate offering price
of no more than $5,000,000. Fourth, the SEC used its authority under
section 3(b) to adopt Rule 242 in early 1980. 62
Rule 242 represented perhaps the most significant innovation. 63 It
introduced the concept of "accredited person" purchasers who could be
excluded from calculation of the number of purchasers to whom the
Rule 242 securities could be sold. 64 Rule 242's accredited person concept was thus the predecessor to Regulation D's "accredited investor"
formulation. In addition, Rule 242 did not require the issuer to establish as a condition of the exemption that the offerees or purchasers were
"suitable," i.e., that they were so sophisticated or so wealthy that they
would not need the benefits of registration. 65 This section 3(b) limited
offering exemption therefore rejected many of the exemptive criteria
crucial to the section 4(2) Rule 146 nonpublic offering exemption.
Since Rule 242 could be used to exempt issues with an aggregate offering price of $2,000,000, some significant change had been achieved.
The pressures for even more significant change, however, did not
abate,66 and the initiative shifted to Congress. The Small Business Issuers' Simplification Act of 198067 and the Small Business Investment
Incentive Act of 198068 produced amendments to the 1933 Act designed
to achieve significant reform in the exemptive system.
The first statutory change was the addition to the 1933 Act of section 4(6),69 which provides an exemption for offers and sales solely to

62.
63.

64.
65.
66.

67.
68.
69.

price was valued to $7,500,000, effective March 31, 1984, [1983-1984 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) ~ 83,430 (Sept. 23, 1983).
17 C.F.R. § 230.242 (1981) (rescinded 1982); Securities Act Release No. 6180,
[1979-1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) ~ 82,426 (Jan. 17, 1980).
For evaluations of Rule 242, see, e.g., Parnell, Kohl & Huff, supra note 43, at 66068 (Rule 242, in conjunction with other federal exemptive rules, provided significant safe harbor relief for issuers in search of capital); Note, Rule 242 and Section
4(6) Securities Registration Exemptions: Recent Allempts to Aid Small Business, 23
WM. & MARY L. REV. 73,101 (1981) ("rule 242 . . . [is] a welcome addition to the
regulatory scheme").
17 C.F.R. § 230.243(a)-(e) (1981) (rescinded 1982).
See Boltz & Wickersham, Small Business and the SEC Recent SEC Initiatives to
Facilitate Small Business Financing, 56 CAL. ST. B.J. 246, 249-50 (1980).
An important example of the continued agitation was the Snowmass Small Business Securities Conference, held at Snowmass, Colorado, on September 27-29,
1979. The conference was held before Rule 242 was adopted but after it had been
proposed. The conference report thus included substantial criticism (as well as
praise) for the proposed Rule 242, together with proposals for more sweeping reform of the overall exemptive system. See Danner, supra note 55, at 1370-76.
Small Business Issuers' Simplification Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-477, 94 Stat.
2275 (codified at 15 U.S.c. §§ 77a note, 77b, 77d (1980» [hereinafter cited as Simplification Act].
Small Business Investment Incentive Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-477, 94 Stat.
2275, 2291 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.c.) [hereinafter
cited as Incentive Act].
Simplification Act § 602 (codified at 15 U.S.c. § 77d(6) (1982».
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accredited investors,70 without any public solicitation, if the aggregate
amount of securities offered is $5,000,000 or less. That figure matched
the aggregate offering price of issues eligible for exemption under section 3(b).71 The second change was the addition to the 1933 Act of
section 19(c), a provision declaring the policy "that there should be
greater Federal and State cooperation in securities matters,'>72 and directing the SEC to work with state representatives toward that end. 73
Section 19(c) made especially clear that the SEC should work with the
state administrators in mitigating the burdens imposed on small business issuers by their exemptive systems. 74
The major result of these SEC and congressional initiatives was
the development of the SEC's Regulation D.7s Since Regulation D has
received abundant comment,76 it need not be summarized in detail
here. 77 Regulation D, although not revolutionary,78 represents a major
70. The Simplification Act also added a new section 2(15) to the 1933 Act to provide a
definition of "accredited investor." Simplification Act § 603 (codified at 15 U.S.c.
§ 77b(l5) (1982)). The SEC later adopted Rule 215 (17 C.F.R. § 230.215 (1983))
setting out a detailed definition of an accredited investor consistent with Regulation D's definition of that term. See Securities Act Release No. 6389, I FED. SEC.
L. REP. (CCH) ~ 83,106 (Mar. 8, 1982); see also Parnell, Kohl & Huff, supra note
43, at 672, 679-81 (Regulation D definition of accredited investor).
71. Incentive Act § 301 (codified at 15 U.S.c. § 77c(b) (1982)).
72. Id. § 505(c)(2) (codified at 15 U.S.c. § 77s(c)(2) (1982)).
73. Id. § 505(c)(l) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77s(c)(I) (1982)).
74. Id. § 505(c)(3)(C) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77s(c)(3)(C) (1982)).
75. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501-506 (1983).
76. E.g., H. BLOOMENTHAL, SECURITIES LAW HANDBOOK 1983 lxi-lxx, 137-54 (1983);
J. HICKS, 1983 LIMITED OFFERING EXEMPTIONS: REGULATION D (1983); L. Loss,
FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 372-75 (1983); Donahue, New Exemptionsfrom the Registration Requirements of the Securities Act 0/ 1933: Regulation D, 10 SEC. REG. L.J. 235 (1982); Parnell, Kohl & Huff, supra note 43, at 67384; Russell, A Proposed West Virginia Response to the Initiative 0/Regulation D, 85
W. VA. L. REV. 59, 73-79 (1982); Sachs & Attman, Raising Capitalfor Small Businesses by the Private Placement of Securities-The New Federal and Maryland
Rules, MD. B.J., June 1982, at 4; Warren, A Review of Ref(Ulation D: The Present
Exemption Regimenfor Limited Offerings Under the Securities Act of 1933,33 AM.
U.L. REV. 355 (1982); Note, Regulation D: Coherent Exemptions for Small Businesses Under the Securities Act of 1933,24 WM. & MARY L. REV. 121 (1982).
77. Regulation D consists of six interrelated rules. Rules 501-502 set forth definitions
and conditions applicable to the specific exemptions provided in Rules 504-506.
Rule 503 states a notice filing requirement. Rule 504, adopted under section 3(b)
of the 1933 Act, provides a simple exemption for offerings with an aggregate offering price of no more than $500,000. Rule 504 replaces former Rule 240. Rule
505, also adopted under section 3(b), provides a more complex exemption for offerings with an aggregate offering price of no more than $5,000,000. It replaces
former Rule 242. Rule 506 is a safe harbor under section 4(2) of the 1933 Act, and
replaces former Rule 146. There is no dollar ceiling for Rule 506 transactions, but
Rule 506 imposes certain exemptive conditions not applied under Rules 504 or
505. For more detailed summary of Regulation D, see authorities cited supra note
76. Because of the substantial coordination of the new Maryland exemptive rules
and Regulation D, some aspects of Regulation D will be considered below in
more detail. See infra text accompanying notes 189-216.
78. For critical discussion of Regulation 0, see Kripke, Has the SEC Taken the Dead
Wood Out o/its Disclosure System?, 8 Bus. LAW. 833 (1983); Nimkin, Offeree So-
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attempt to eliminate three general problems: (1) the conceptual and terminological inconsistencies fostered by the ad hoc character of the preexisting federal exemptive system; (2) the low dollar ceilings imposed
on section 3(b) exemptions; and (3) the serious compliance problems
generated by the offeree suitability requirements of section 4(2) and
Rule 146. These substantial changes, furthermore, meant more than
reform ofJedera/law: Regulation D also created a new framework for
substantial federal-state coordination.
Regulation D created this framework because it is, at least in comparison to the preexisting system, relatively coherent, systematic, and
justifiable as a balancing of the needs of investor protection and capital
formation,19 In addition, since Regulation D promises to be a major
financing device for both large and small issuers, substantial pressure
has been placed on the states by the SEC, the securities industry, and
the bar to conform to some aspects of the Regulation D approach.
The SEC's adoption of Regulation D has forced state administrators to rethink the conceptual premises of their exemptive systems, their
approach to the allocation of regulatory responsibilities, and the balance to be struck between their traditional concern for investor protection and the need to reduce the costs of capital formation. The state
response to Regulation D, although by no means uniform,80 reflects a
serious effort by state administrators to accomplish that rethinking and
to create a state exemptive system that is both practicable and theoretically coherent. This article will not survey the universe of state responses to Regulation D. Instead, it will analyze how the exemptive
system under the Maryland Securities Act has been revised to facilitate
federal-state coordination and capital formation, particularly small
business capital formation. This article will also explain how the recent
revision of the Maryland exemptive system used the reform of the federal exemptive system to mitigate the problems traditionally associated
with the blue sky treatment of limited and private offerings.
The impact of the recent revisions, however, must be analyzed in
light of the historical development of limited and private offering exphistication in Private Offerings, 15 REV. SEC. REG. 863 (1982); Schneider, Regulation D-Evaluation and Critique, 15 REV. SEC. REG. 983 (1982); Seldin, Who Cares
About Accredited Investors?, 15 REV. SEC. REG. 810 (1982).
79. Not everyone would agree with this statement. Some critics feel that Regulation
D does not go far enough toward remedying some basic flaws in the exemptive
system. See authorities cited supra note 78. Others feel that the Regulation D
exemptions will encourage abusive offerings. See, e.g., Seligman, The Historical
Need for a Mandatory Corporate Disclosure System, 9 J. CORP. L. I, 61 (1983)
("the commission did a disservice . . . to investors in recommending substantial
increases in the size of the section 3(b) exemption before the commission had
adequately studied the implication of the increases"); NASAA Memorandum,
supra note 39, at 2 ("The [state] adoption of Rule 506 . . . would cause increased
enforcement problems").
80. For a recent survey of the state responses, see Halloran & Linderman, supra note
14, at 179-239.
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emptions under the Maryland Securities Act. Accordingly, this analysis will begin with a short review of the background to reform.
IV.

A.

BACKGROUND TO REFORM: CONTINUITY AND
CHANGE UNDER THE MARYLAND SECURITIES
ACT

The 1962 Enactment and the Principle of Coordination

The first Maryland blue sky statute, which was enacted in 1920,81
differed dramatically from the far-reaching, paternalistic statutes of the
Midwest. 82 Although the statute empowered the state's attorney general to investigate possible securities frauds and to issue an order directing the offender to cease and desist therefrom,83 it did not define
securities fraud as a crime, require securities registration, or mandate
delivery of a disclosure document to offerees or purchasers. The General Assembly amended the statute in 1937 to require limited licensing
of persons selling securities in the state,84 but no other effort was made
to expand the scope of Maryland securities regulation until 1961.85
By 1961, the Uniform Act, or major parts of it, had been adopted
in fourteen states. 86 Most states, regardless of whether they had
adopted the Uniform Act, required the registration of securities offeringS.87 Maryland thus found itself in a somewhat anomalous position.
This sense of being out of the mainstream of modern securities regulation, when coupled with a perception of a sizable increase in the
number of securities dealers registered in Maryland and in the volume
of securities sold in the state,88 led to action. In 1961, the governor
appointed the Committee to Study the Administration of the Blue Sky
81. 1920 Md. Laws 552 (codified at MD. ANN. CODE art. 32A, §§ 16-17 (repealed
1962».
82. See supra note I (sources discussing original midwestern approach). The 1920
Maryland legislation was typical of the approach of several eastern states-antifraud jurisdiction and no registration of securities offerings. See J. EDELMAN,
SECURITIES REGULATION IN THE 48 STATES 18 (1942) (only New York, New
Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, and Connecticut had antifraud statutes). For a contemporary attack on the original midwestern approach to blue sky regulation and
a defense of what would become the eastern alternative, see Perrin, The "Blue
Sky" Laws, 10 BENCH & BAR (N.S.) 483, 495-96 (1916).
83. 1920 Md. Laws 552 (codified at MD. ANN. CODE art. 32A, §§ 16-17 (repealed
1962».
84. 1937 Md. Laws 348 (codified at MD. ANN. CODE art. 32A, §§ IOA-IOC, 12, 14
(repealed 1962».
85. For brief descriptions of the pre-1961 regulatory system, see REPORT OF COMMITTEE TO STUDY THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE BLUE SKY LAW OF MARYLAND TO
THE LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL AND THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF MARYLAND 1-2
(Oct. II, 1961) [hereinafter cited as MARYLAND REPORT); Miller, A Prospectus on
the Maryland Securities Act, 23 MD. L. REV. 289, 289-90 (1963).
86. Miller, supra note 85, at 291.
87. MARYLAND REPORT, supra note 85, at 5.
88. Id. at 1.
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Law in Maryland (Study Committee).89 The Study Committee's Report recommended the adoption of a modified version of the Uniform
Act,90 and the creation of a Division of Securities (Division) within the
State Law Department. 91
The subsequent legislative adoption in 1962 of a modified version
of the Uniform Act92 represented a significant expansion of the regulatory scheme. The statute created a new administrative agency, required registration of securities, imposed stricter conditions for
registration of broker-dealers, and defined a set of civil and criminal
liabilities-all novelties in Maryland. The Maryland version of the
Uniform Act also reflected, however, the Study Committee's desire to
make state regulation practicable through maximum coordination between state and federal law. This principle has become a key characteristic of Maryland securities regulation, and has provided an essential
element of continuity throughout more than twenty years of statutory
and administrative change. Indeed, this principle was one of the primary sources of the exemptive concepts used in the new regulations
described below,93 as an overview of the Maryland Securities Act (Act)
and the rules issued thereunder will show.
This principle was clearly expressed in three aspects of the original
Act. First, the Study Committee excluded from the Act those provisions of the Uniform Act that permitted the administrator to deny registration to an offering because of excessive compensation to
underwriters, sellers, and promoters. 94 By excluding those provisions,
the Study Committee refused to follow the Uniform Act in adopting
some of the typical blue sky standards governing the substantive merits
of the underlying transactions. 95 Accordingly, the Study Committee
also declined to follow the example of the many non-Uniform Act jurisdictions that permitted the administrator to deny registration be89. Id The Chairman of the Study Committee was Arthur W. Machen, Jr., a member of the Maryland Bar.
90. Id at 6.
91. Id at 7.
92. Maryland Securities Act, 1962 Md. Laws. I (codified at MD. ANN. CODE art. 32A,
§§ 13-44 (repealed 1975 and recodified at MD. CORPS. & ASS'NS CODE ANN.
§§ 11-10 1 to -805 (1975)).
93. See infra text accompanying notes 152-330.
94. SeeUNIF. SEC. ACT § 306(a)(F), 7A U.L.A. 621 (1956) (permitting denial, suspension, or revocation of effectiveness on the ground that "the offering has been or
would be made with unreasonable amounts of underwriters' and sellers' discounts, commissions, or other compensation, or promoters' profits or participation, or unreasonable amounts or kinds of options"). The Maryland statute also
omitted those provisions of the Uniform Act that permit the administrator to require impoundment of the offering proceeds or place in escrow the offering proceeds of promoter's stock. Id § 305(g), 7A U.L.A. at 614. These regulatory
devices are typical of the merit statutes and are foreign to the 1933 Act.
95. L. Loss, supra note 3, at 85 (many merit states imposed limitations on selling
costs, promoters' profits, and options issued to underwriters, promoters, insiders,
and other persons).
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cause the offering was not "fair, just and equitable" with respect to the
investing public. 96 Its Report identifies the basis for this departure
from the Uniform Act and blue sky tradition: the drafters were "adhering strongly to the philosophy of disclosure as reflected in the Securities
Act of 1933."97 Although the Report does not articulate its premises in
detail, the rejection of merit regulation in favor of disclosure regulation
reflected a conviction that Maryland and federal securities regulation
should operate upon similar principles. 98
96. Id. at 84 (California and Kansas are examples of states imposing a "fair, just and
equitable" standard).
97. MARYLAND REPORT, supra note 85, at 6. This language was used to support the
Study Committee's recommendation that the new Maryland statute require delivery of a prospectus in connection with the offering. The Uniform Act left the
question of prospectus delivery to the discretion of the administrator. UNIF. SEC.
ACT § 304(a), 7A U.L.A. 612 (1956); see L. Loss, supra note 3, at 61-63.
The disclosure premises of the new Maryland statute were also expressed by
Decatur H. Miller, the first Maryland Securities Commissioner, who stated that
the statute "regulates certain offerings of securities with the principal purpose of
assuring that full disclosure of the material facts will be made to every prospective
investor." Miller, supra note 85, at 292.
98. It is unclear whether a residual merit authority can be found in MD. CORPS. &
ASS'NS CODE ANN. § 11-511(a)(5) (1975), which permits the administrator to
deny, suspend, or revoke the effectiveness of any registration statement on the
grounds that "[tJhe offering has worked or tended to work a fraud on purchasers
or would so operate." The Division has, in a very few instances, informally interpreted this provision as giving it the authority to deny effectiveness to clearly egregious offerings, even in the absence of true disclosure problems. The Division's
disclosure of its intention to rely on this subsection has typically led the would be
registrant to withdraw the registration statement.
Although the Division has used this interpretation only in a very few cases
involving offerings with a high potential for abuse, the authority for the interpretation remains unclear. First, § 11-511(a)(I) authorizes the Commissioner to
deny, suspend, or revoke effectiveness if the registration statement "contains any
statement which was, in the light of the circumstances under which it was made,
false or misleading with respect to any material fact." This separate provision
allows the Commissioner to act on the basis of fraudulent statements or omissions
contained within the filing. Section 11-511(a)(5), like UNIF. SEC. ACT
§ 306(a)(2)(E), 7A U.L.A. 620-21 (1956), must allow the Commissioner to do
something else. The problem is defining that "something else." Unfortunately,
the draftsman's commentary to UNIF. SEC. ACT. § 306(a) is cryptic, and provides
little guidance:
Clause (E): This clause, after Clause (F), is one which gives the Administrator the greatest amount of discretion. On the one hand, § 401(d)
codifies the traditional view that the term "fraud" in securities legislation
is not limited to common-law deceit. On the other hand, Clause (E) is
not meant to be as broad as the old "sound business principles" standard
in Kansas, for example, or the "fair, just, and equitable" standard in
California. Somewhere between the narrow limitation of common-law
deceit and the opposite extreme of permitting the Administrator to substitute his business judgment for the registrant's, a degree of flexibility
seems to be essential. Substantially, the Clause (E) standard is today
universal or almost so. It could not be deleted, as two or three commentators suggested it should be, without going over to a purely disclosure
philosophy which is simply not the philosophy of the overwhelming majority of the blue sky laws and the problem could not be altogether
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Second, the new Act permitted registration by coordination with
Regulation A99 offerings. 100 This was not a common provision at that
time, and expressed clearly the Study Committee's desire to promote
the coordination of state and federal regulation: "We recommend extension of the coordination principle to filings under Regulation A so
that any offering which is registered under the 1933 Act or qualified for
exemption from registration under federal administrative regulation
may be registered for local sale by following the simplest possible coordination procedure."101
Third, and most important for purposes of this article, the new
avoided even under a disclosure statute, as the federal experience has
richly demonstrated.
L. Loss, supra note 3, at 84-85.
Loss gave us flexibility, but his commentary does not explain how much flexibility has been granted. In addition, his commentary provides little guidance for
the interpretation of this language in the context of a version of t.he Uniform Act
from which al/ other merit provisions have been excised.
The author is aware of three different interpretations of this language common to the Uniform Act and the Maryland statute. The first is the restrictive
interpretation suggested by the first Maryland Securities Commissioner. Referring to the "work a fraud" language, the Commissioner stated: "[t]his of course
covers the situation where the fraud inheres in the methods used to sell the securities rather than in the registration statement." Miller, supra note 85, at 305.
Miller cites no authority for this proposition, but it is perhaps supported by a
literal reading of the statute. Section 11-511(a)(I) permits denial of effectiveness
when the fraud inheres in the "registration statement." Section 11-511(a)(I) permits denial when the fraud inheres in the "offering." The literal language thus
may contemplate only a difference in the manner and timing of the fraud: in the
filing or in the sales effort.
The second is the interpretation applied informally by the Division in recent
years. As described above, this interpretation would permit the Division to deny
effectiveness to the clearly egregious offering. This interpretation has been applied, furthermore, on the premises that these offerings are infrequent, and that
this language cannot support a scheme of routine and detailed merit regulation.
The third and most expansive interpretation is that currently being applied
by the Massachusetts Securities Division. The agency apparently reads the same
language in the Massachusetts statute (MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 1lOA, § 306(a)(2)(E) (West Supp. 1983» as permitting full-scale "fair, just and equitable"
merit review of every registered offering. See Empiricar Research Project, supra
note 38, at 809. This interpretation has been severely criticized as inconsistent
with both the draftsman's commentary and the official comment to the Uniform
Act. L. Loss, supra note 3, at 81-83; see Honig, Massachusetts Securities Regulation: In Search of the Fulcrum, 13 U. BALT. L. REV. 469, 474-76 (1984); Honig,
Massachusetts Securities Regulation: An Evolving Matrix, B. BAR J., Nov. 1983, at
10.
The inconsistency of these three interpretations underscores the need for a
formal administrative interpretation of this language or statutory change.
99. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.251 to .264 (1983).
100. MD. ANN. CODE art. 32A, § 21(d) (repealed and recodified at MD. CORPs. &
ASS'NS CODE ANN. § 11-503(d) (1975».
101. See MARYLAND REPORT, supra note 85, at 42. The Study Committee also stated:
"We also recommend that certain minor changes be made in the administrative
provisions of the Uniform Act to eliminate needless local controls over coordinated offerings." Id.
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Act's version of the Uniform Act's section 402(b)(9) exemption represented an attempt to approximate the federal exemption, as it was then
understood, under section 4(2) of the 1933 Act. Section 402(b)(9) exempted only transactions pursuant to offers to not more than ten persons during any period of twelve consecutive months, if the seller
reasonably believed that all the buyers in this state were purchasing for
investment, and no commission or other remuneration was paid or
given directly or indirectly for soliciting any prospective buyer. 102 In
contrast, the Act exempted under section 26(b)(9) "any transaction pursuant to an offer directed by the offeror to not more than twenty-jive
persons," and it dropped the prohibition on sales remuneration,103 differences reflecting a desire to make the Maryland exemption more consistent with federal law.
The Maryland exemption was made more consistent with the federal exemption by raising the ceiling on offerees to twenty-five (the
maximum number of offerees then thought to be permissible under an
early SEC interpretation of section 4(2),104 and eliminating the Uniform Act's prohibition against remuneration of persons engaged in the
selling effort, a concept foreign to section 4(2). In short, the general
commitment to substantial coordination of Maryland and federal securities regulation was specifically expressed in the new Act's exemption for private and limited offerings of securities. 105 It is difficult,
however, to determine how well the section 26(b)(9) statutory exemp102. UNIF. SEC. ACT § 402(b)(9), 7A U.L.A. 641 (1956). This section exempted:
any transaction pursuant to an offer directed by the offeror to not more
than ten persons ... in this state during any period of twelve consecutive months, whether or not the offeror or any of the offerees is then
present in this state, if (A) the seller reasonably believes that all buyers
in this state ... are purchasing for investment, and (B) no commission
or other remuneration is paid or given directly or indirectly for soliciting
any prospective buyer in this state.
Id. (emphasis added).
103. MD. ANN. CODE art. 32A, § 26(b)(9) (1957) (emphasis added) (repealed and recodified at MD. CORPS. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. § 11-602(9) (1975».
104. The 25 offeree rule of thumb applied in 1961 was based largely on an early opinion of the SEC General Counsel that indicated that under ordinary circumstances
an offering to approximately 25 or fewer persons would presumably not involve a
public offering. Securities Act Release No. 33-285, 1 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) ~~
2740-2744 (Jan. 24, 1935). See L. Loss, supra note 50, at 661-62 (1961); Section
4(2) and Statutory Law, 31 Bus. LAW. 485, 486 (1975). By 1969, however, Loss
remarked that "one can no longer assume that an offering to not more than
twenty-five persons (or any lesser number) will be considered exempt. . . ." L.
Loss, supra note 50, at 2644; see a/so L. Loss, supra note 76, at 370-71.
105. The Committee formed to analyze the administration of the blue sky law in
Maryland stated:
Since the number of 25 offerees is often considered a rule of thumb for
gauging the eligibility of a transaction for the private sale exemption in
Section 4(1) of the Securities Act of 1933, we suggest that this figure be
used in § 26(b)(9) of the Securities Act . . . .
We have also deleted a condition (albeit subject to waiver by the
Commissioner) in the Uniform Act prohibiting the payment of any com-
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tion of the 1962 enactment "worked" without empirical data demonstrating how the Division implemented its exemptive policies and how
the private bar adapted its practice to those policies. The following
evaluation, therefore, reflects informal observation of the Maryland experience with this exemption.

B.

The Evolution oj'Rule S-7

Many nonspecialist practitioners seemingly read the section
26(b)(9) exemption in a simplistic manner. They tended to ignore the
statutory language requiring the seller to establish a reasonable belief
in the purchaser's investment intent, and they either ignored or failed
to discover the Division's informal policy requiring offeree sophistication as a condition of the exemption. \06 In short, these practitioners
regarded the twenty-five offeree limit as the only criterion. In addition,
they sometimes tended to read the number twenty-five as applying to
purchasers rather than ojferees, as if there were no difference between
the two. Indeed, it is still possible today to hear the nonspecialist argue
that if his client sells to no more than twenty-five persons, the client will
be "safe" in Maryland. This problem was compounded by a tendency
among more careful but perhaps less scrupulous practitioners to sell to
no more than twenty-five persons and then, in communications with
the Division, to reconstruct the number of offerees to make the offering
appear to comply with the statute. \07 From the investor protection perspective, therefore, section 26(b)(9) created problems. Its apparent simplicity led to naive oversimplification and misreading, because the
statute's brief reference to investment intent was often ignored, and the
Division's informal policy requiring offeree sophistication might be
either ignored or unknown. The limitation on the number of offers,
furthermore, provided relatively little social benefit since it was difficult
to enforce, \08 and it imposed a questionable burden on the small business enterprise seeking to raise a limited amount of capital. \09
To experienced securities law practitioners, section 26(b)(9) was
not simple, but was instead a complex trap for the unwary. The sense
of complexity arose because the principle of coordination had led to a
tradition of analyzing section 26(b)(9) in terms of section 4(2) of the

106.

107.
108.
109.

mission or other remuneration in private transactions. This condition is
not imposed by the SEC, and it seems to us needlessly restrictive.
MARYLAND REPORT, supra note 85, at 46.
Maryland Securities Act Release No.5, at 3-4 (Sept. 28, 1972) [hereinafter cited as
Release No.5] (this Release is no longer published in the BLUE SKY L. REP.
(CCH), but is on file with the Division). A dismaying reflection of this tendency is
Hohensee v. State, 42 Md. App. 329, 339,400 A.2d 455, 461 (1979). See infra text
accompanying notes 137-141.
See Release No.5, supra note 106, at 3-4; Notes & Comments, supra note 28, at
280.
See Release No.5, supra note 106, at 5; Notes & Comments, supra note 28, at 280.
See Release No.5, supra note 106, at 6.
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1933 Act. Accordingly, the confusion over the section 4(2) exemption
that developed in the late 1960's and early 1970'S110 spread to section
26(b)(9). The practitioner involved in the debates over section 4(2)'s
requirements of "sophistication" and "access to information" had to
think carefully about the role of these concepts in the Maryland exemption. Section 26(b)(9) thus amounted to a paradox: it was either too
simple or too complex, depending upon who was reading it. This provision seemed to encourage noncompliance by the practitioner eager to
rely on a fanciful, bright line twenty-five offeree or purchaser test, and
it frustrated the conscientious attorney by dragging him into the morass
of section 4(2) law.
By the early 1970's, the Maryland policy of encouraging coordination of section 26(b)(9) and section 4(2) exemptions seemed to have
created more problems than it had solved. The Division's awareness of
this problem with federal coordination, when coupled with its perception of investor abuse under section 26(b)(9), III led to the 1972 adoption of Rule S-7, 112 a safe harbor under the statutory exemption.
The 1972 version of Rule S-7 was an attempt to define with precision the exemptive conditions necessary for investor protection. First,
the rule made clear that investor sophistication was a condition of exemption. l13 This represented an administrative codification of informal Division policy and a reflection of then current trends on the
federal level. The only exception to this requirement was an exclusion
from the sophistication requirement for certain "related persons."114
Second, Rule S-7 reemphasized the distinction between offerees and
purchasers. This was accomplished by distinguishing between transactions with an aggregate offering price of $50,000 or more and those
with an aggregate offering price of a lesser amount. 115 The offerings of
less than $50,000 could include no more than twenty-five purchasers in
Maryland, but with no limit on the number of offerees per se. 116 The
110. See supra note 4S.
Ill. See Release No. S, supra note 106, at 3-4; Notes & Comments, supra note 28, at
280-8S.
112. Maryland Securities Rule S-7 (1972), MD. ADMIN. CODE tit.. 02, § .02.03.07 (rescinded 1974) [hereinafter referred to as 1972 Rule S-7]; see Release No.5, supra
note 106. The text of the 1972 version of Rule S-7 is contained in Notes & Comments, supra note 28, at 286-88. That rule was substantially revised in 1974. See
infra note 121. The designation "S-7" reflects a mode of codifying Maryland administrative regulations that has since been abandoned.
113. MD. ADMIN. CODE tit. .02, § .02.03.07(b)(I)-(2) (1972) (rescinded 1974).
114. Id. "Related persons" were defined in the rule to include "the officers and directors, or general and managing partners, of the issuer, their spouses, parents, brothers, sisters, and children." Id. § .02.03.07(a)(S) (rescinded 1974).
lIS. Id. § .02.03.07(b)(I)-(2) (rescinded 1974).
116. A practical limit on the number of offerees, however, was the Rule's ban on "general advertising." Id. § .02.03.07(b)(I) (rescinded 1974). In addition, institutional
investors were excluded from the calculations of the numbers of offerees and purchasers. Id. § .02.03.07(f) (rescinded 1974). With respect to a subsequent revision
of this aspect of 1972 Rule S-7, see infra note 12S.
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offerings involving $50,000 or more remained limited to twenty-five ofjerees in Maryland. Third, the rule avoided the section 4(2) problem of
determining whether the offerees had access to information by not requiring access to information or any specific form of disclosure as a
condition of the exemption. Fourth, the rule required a short notice
filing with the Division after completion of the offering-a device intended to help the Division detect abuses. I 17
When viewed as a whole, the version of Rule S-7 adopted in 1972
represented a liberalization of the exemptive concepts being developed
under section 4(2). Rule S-7 permitted the issuer to disregard the
number of offerees in smaller deals; it allowed the issuer to avoid the
sophistication requirement in transactions with related persons; and it
rejected the federal principle that access to information or specific disclosure should be a condition of the exemption. The functional relationship between the federal and state exemptions could thus be stated
in the following terms: if the issuer complied with the more stringent
requirements of the section 4(2) exemption, it would almost certainly
qualify for exemption under Rule S-7, provided that it made the appropriate notice filing in a timely manner. If, however, the issuer structured the transaction to exploit one or more of the liberalized aspects of
Rule S-7, the transaction might not qualify for the stricter section 4(2)
exemption on the federal level. This anomaly thus created a snare for
those practitioners not sensitive to the more restrictive requirements of
federal law. 118
The continued proliferation of section 4(2) decisional law and the
SEC's adoption of Rule 146119 in 1974 caused the Division to adopt a
new Rule S-7. The 1974 version, however, represented more than an
updating. Its express application of the concept of "exemption by coordination" reflected once again the basic principle defined by the Study
Committee and currently being applied in the new Maryland exemptive regulations. 120
Exemption by coordination under the 1974 version of Rule S-7
was a simple matter. The rule provided that any offering complying
with the conditions of Rule 146 would be deemed in compliance with
Rule S-7 upon receipt by the Division of the issuer's representation on.
Form D-l that the issuer had complied with Rule 146. 121 This direct
117. MD. ADMIN. CODE tit. .02, § .02.03.07(a) (rescinded 1974).
118. See authorities cited supra note 48 (with respect to the restrictiveness of section
4(2».
119. Securities Act Release No. 33-5487, 1 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) ~ 2710 (Apr. 23,
1974).
120. See supra text accompanying notes 92-105; see also infra text accompanying notes
147-67 (discussing two new state exemptions, MD. ADMIN. CODE tit. 02,
§ .02.04.09 and § .02.04.15, which allow federal-state coordination).
121. Maryland Securities Rule S-7 (1974), MD. ADMIN. CODE tit. .02, § .02.03.07.H
(rescinded 1983) [hereinafter referred to as 1974 Rule S-7]. For a comment on
this coordinating device, see Coles, supra note 45, at 462; Notes & Comments,
supra note 28, at 296-98. The promulgation of 1974 Rule S-7 followed two years
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approach to the problem of coordinating state and federal exemptions
represented a significant advantage for the issuer engaged in an interstate transaction under Rule 146. Issuer's counsel would not have to
consider restructuring the transaction to comply with the more restrictive requirements of a Maryland exemption because there were no such
restrictive requirements. Indeed, counsel would not even have to spend
time reading the regulation to discover that there were no such requirements-the coordinating language was simple and clear.
The 1974 version of Rule S-7 also went beyond coordination with
Rule 146. The Division recognized that a transaction could be exempted at the federal level under the statutory section 4(2) exemption
rather than under the Rule 146 safe harbor, or as an intrastate offering
under section 3(a)(1l) of the 1933 Act.122 Accordingly, Rule S-7 also
provided an exemption used in connection with offerings exempted on
those bases. 123
This aspect of Rule S-7 can be characterized as a liberalized application of some of the section 4(2) and Rule 146 concepts. For instance,
the state exemption drew upon the familiar section 4(2) criteria of offeree sophistication,124 a thirty-five person limit on the number of purchasers "in this state,"125 a restriction on resale,126 and limitations on
the manner of offering.127 The exemption, however, was substantially
less rigorous than these federal exemptions in three key respects. First,
it did not impose as a condition any specific disclosure or access to
information. 128 Second, it excepted related person offerees from the sophistication requirement. 129 Third, it permitted the issuer to exclude
related persons from the calculation of thirty-five purchasers. 13o The
only potential snare was the requirement that a timely notice be filed as

122.

123.
124.
125.

126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

of experimentation with amendment of 1972 Rule S-7. See Maryland Securities
Act Release No. II (Aug. 10, 1973) [hereinafter cited as Release No. II] (this
release is no longer published in the BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH), but is on file with
the Division; the text of the release was published in the Daily Record. Daily
Rec., Aug. 10, 1973, at 5, col. 4.
See Maryland Securities Act Release No. 20, I BLUE SKY L. REp. (CCH) ~ 15,553,
at 11,553-55 (Oct. 24, 1974). This Release was a joint release with the Delaware
Securities Commissioner, whose office simultaneously adopted an identical version of 1974 Rule S-7.
MD. ADMIN. CODE tit. .02, § .02.03.07 A-G (rescinded 1983).
Id. § .02.03.07 D (rescinded 1983).
Id. § .02.03.07 E (rescinded 1983). A 1973 amendment of 1972 Rule S-7 eliminated the distinction between offerings of less than $50,000 (25 purchasers) and
those of more than $50,000 (25 offerees), and replaced it with a single limitation to
35 purchasers in Maryland. See Release No. II, supra note 121, at 3. This approach was carried over into 1974 Rule S-7.
MD. ADMIN. CODE tit.. 02, § .02.03.07 F (rescinded 1983).
Id. § .02.03.07 C (rescinded 1983).
q. Rule I 46(e), 17 C.F.R. § 230. I 46(e) (rescinded 1982) (disclosure or access to
information required as a condition of the exemption).
MD. ADMIN. CODE tit. .02, § .02.03.07 D (rescinded 1983).
Id. § .02.03.07 E(2)(a)(v) (rescinded 1983).
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a condition of the exemption. 131 Since this ministerial task might easily
be overlooked, the filing requirement created some cause for concern.
The concern, however, was not all that substantial. Rule S-7 was a safe
harbor, a nonexclusive rule. An offering that failed to meet each of the
specific requirements of the exemption could, in the appropriate case,
fall-back on the statutory exemption. This statutory fall-back could be
especially helpful when the only noncompliance was failure to make
the notice filing in a timely fashion.
Rule S-7 thus was an effective rule. It was a useful coordinating
device for the many interstate transactions that proceeded under Rule
146, and it also provided a practicable framework for transactions exempted under section 3(a)(11). In addition, it posed no obstacle to the
issuer's reliance on the statutory section 4(2) exemption, because an offering that met the more stringent requirements of that federal exemption would almost certainly qualify for the less stringent Maryland
exemption. The only problem in this regard was the same one associated with the 1972 version of Rule S-7: an issuer that took advantage of
Rule S-7's exception of related persons from the sophistication requirement, or that failed to provide a disclosure document or access to information, might have found the section 4(2) exemption unavailable.
Although Rule S-7 was effective, developments in state and federal
law eventually rendered it obsolete.132 By 1981, it had become apparent that some modification was needed in the Maryland statutory exemption. The need for amendment of section 11-602(9), as former
section 26(b)(9) was designated after the 1975 recodification of the Act,
derived from three problems.
First, the adoption and widespread use of Rule S-7 created substantial disparities between the statutory exemption and the rule exemption. The disparities were of both a philosophical and a practical
nature. The statute, for example, permitted no more than twenty-five
offerees. Rule S-7, following Rule 146, permitted sales to thirty-five
purchasers (excludin~ related persons), and placed no limit on the
number of offerees. 13 This exercise of the commissioner's statutory authority to "further condition this exemption, [and] increase or decrease
the number or offerees permitted," 134 created an important inconsistency between the statutory exemption and the rule exemption. Similarly, the section 4(2) and Rule 146 ban on general solicitation and
public advertising may have been implicit in the section 11-602(9) exemption, but the statute made no express reference to it. Rule S-7, in
contrast, explicitly stated the prohibition. 135 Rule S-7 thus reflected the
131. Id. § .02.03.07 G (rescinded 1983). That filing was to be on Form D-l, or contain
the information required by that form. Id.
132. See supra text accompanying notes 39-80.
133. MD. ADMIN. CODE tit. .02, § .02.03.07 E (rescinded 1983).
134. MD. CORPS. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. § 11-602(9) (1975) (amended 1981).
135. MD. ADMIN. CODE tit. .02, § .02.03.07 E (rescinded 1983).
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exemptive concepts of the middle 1970's while the statute reflected
those of 1962Y6
Second, the availability of this partially inconsistent statutory exemption outside of the Rule S-7 safe harbor generated both uncertainty
and a threat to investor protection. The uncertainty arose from the previously discussed disparity between the conditions of the statutory exemption and those of the rule exemption. The threat to investor
protection was demonstrated most clearly in the 1979 decision by the
Court of Special Appeals of Maryland in Hohensee v. State,137 a case
that reflected a tendency to read the statutory exemption in a simplistic
and misleading manner.
In Hohensee, the court reversed a criminal conviction of an individual who had allegedly violated the Act through employing an unregistered agent. 138 The court found that because the defendant's offers
in Maryland were exempt under section 11-602(9), there had been no
need for the agent to register,139 and hence no criminal violation had
occurred. The court's conclusion that the offers of sale were exempt
was based solely on a finding that there were less than twenty-five offerees in the state. 14O The court ignored the express statutory requirement conditioning the exemption upon the sellers' reasonable belief in
the buyer's investment intent. In addition, the court failed to read section 11-602(9) against the backdrop of section 4(2) law, Rule S-7, and
informal Division policy, and did not consider the possibility that the
exemption should depend upon the seller's demonstration that the offerees (or even purchasers) met some kind of suitability criteria and
that no general solicitation or public advertising had been used. 141
The failure of the Hohensee court to apply all the statutory conditions and to acknowledge section 4(2) and Rule S-7 as relevant sources
of authority for interpretation of the exemption produces an inaccurate,
reductionist reading of the statutory exemption. That reading, furthermore, undermined the Division's attempt to define a coherent and comprehensive exemption in Rule S-7. Rule S-7 attempted to balance the
136. See supra text accompanying notes 102-05.
137. 42 Md. App. 329,400 A.2d 455 (1979).
138. Maryland law requires agent registration. MD. CORPS. & ASS'NS CODE ANN.
§ 11-402 (1975). "Agent" means "an individual other than a broker-dealer who
represents a broker-dealer or issuer in effecting or attempting to effect the
purchase or sale of securities." Id. § 11-IOI(b)(I).
139. The court was able to reach this conclusion because the Act excludes from the
definition of agent an individual who represents an issuer in effecting a transaction exempt under section 11-602. Id. § ll-IOI(b)(3)(ii).
140. Hohensee, 42 Md. App. at 339, 400 A.2d at 461.
141. The court was apparently aware of the existence of Rule S-7. See id. at 335 n.17,
400 A.2d at 459 n.17. The court's failure to read the exemption against the backdrop of section 4(2) was especially perplexing in view of its quotation of the Study
Committee's statement in the MARYLAND REPORT that "the Act roughly approximates locally the coverage of the two principal federal securities laws. . . ." Id.
at 331, 400 A.2d at 457.
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interests of capital formation and investor protection; it is unclear
whether the Hohensee court was even aware of the need for this kind of
balancing. The decision thus demonstrated the risks associated with an
exemptive system divided between a detailed rule and a statute that
might be read simplistically.
Third, the Commissioner's adoption of the Rule S-7 exemption by
coordination arguably could be supported by the Commissioner's statutory authority to further condition the section 11-602(b)(9) exemption.142 The usefulness of the coordination device, however, suggested
the need for specific statutory authority. A specific authorization
would not only legitimize the Rule 146 coordination but also could be
used as a basis for coordination with other important new federal rules,
such as those being developed by the SEC under section 3(b) of the
1933 Act.
V.

THE NEW MARYLAND EXEMPTIONS FOR LIMITED
AND PRIVATE OFFERINGS: REGULATIONS 9 AND
15

A.

First Steps: The 1981 Amendments to the Maryland Securities Act

The former Commissioner of the Division, K. Houston Matney,
responded to these problems with the Maryland exemptive system by
proposing certain amendments to the Act in the 1981 session of the
Maryland General Assembly. This legislation was enacted,143 resulting
in the amendment of section 11-602(9) and adoption of a new section
11-602(15).144 The current amended version of section 11-602(9)
provides:
To the extent the Commissioner by rule or order permits,
any offer or sale in a transaction involving the sale by an issuer to not more than 35 persons, other than those designated
in item (8) of this section, in this State during any period of 12
consecutive months, whether or not the seller or any purchaser is then present in this State, if the seller reasonably
believes that all the purchasers in this State, other than those
designated in item (H) of this section, are purchasing for investment, and if the securities have not been offered to the
general public by advertisement or general solicitation but the
Commissioner by rule or order, as to any security or transaction or any type of security or transaction, may withdraw or
further conditIOn this exemption, increase or decrease the
number of purchasers permitted, or waive the condition relating to their investment intent. 145
142. MD. CORPS. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. § 11-602(9) (1975) (amended 1981).
143. 1981 Md. Laws 775 (codified at MD. CORPS. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. § 11-602(a)(15)
(Supp. 1984».
144. MD. CORPS. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. § 11-602(15) (Supp. 1984).
145. Id. § 11-602(9).
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These changes require little explanation since they were directly
responsive to the problems outlined in the previous section. The tension between inconsistent statutory and rule exemptions was eliminated
by deleting the purely statutory exemption: a transaction can now be
exempted under section 11-602(9) only "to the extent the Commissioner by rule or order permits." Any rule implementing section 11602(9) thus would not be merely a safe harbor. Instead, it would be the
exclusive means of gaining the exemption, save through exercise of the
Commissioner's order power. Modernization was achieved by replacing a reference to "twenty-five offerees" with a reference to "thirty-five
purchasers," and by substituting "purchaser" or "purchasers" for "offerees" throughout the section. The statute thus supplies the basis for a
rule reflecting the modem trend toward purchaser rather than offeree
regulation. Finally, the statute now expressly prohibits public advertising and general solicitation.
New section 11-602(15) provides:
To the extent permitted by rule or order of the Commissioner, any offer or sale within this State by an issuer now or
hereafter exempted from § 5 of the Securities Act of 1933 by
virtue of a rule or regulation adopted by the United States
Securities and Exchange CommisslOn under § 3(b) or § 4(2)
of that Act; if the issuer files with the Commissioner a notice
of intent to claim exemption under this paragraph, at such
time or times, in such form, and containing such mformation
as the Commissioner determines. 146
This exemption, like that under section 11-602(9), is not self-executing,
but depends upon the Commissioner's exercise of administrative authority. Accordingly, the 1981 legislation set the stage for a rulemaking
project.
B.

The Ru/emaking Project: Defining Different Exemptions for
Different Functions

That rulemaking project commenced in the autumn of 1981 as a
cooperative effort of a committee composed of representatives of the
Division and the Securities Law Committee of the Section of Corporation, Banking, and Business Law of the Maryland State Bar Association (the Rulemaking Committee). 147 Although the Rulemaking
Committee's efforts were delayed by the SEC's proposal and ultimate
adoption of Regulation D, it finally proposed new Regulations 9 148 and
146. Id. § 11-602(IS).
147. The Rulemaking Committee consisted of former Commissioner K. Houston Matney and Assistant Attorney General Susan M. Rittenhouse, representing the Division, and Theodore Kaplan, Edward E. Obstler and this author, representing the
Securities Law Committee.
148. MD. ADMIN. CODE tit. .02, § .02.04.09 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Reg. 9].
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15 149 as responses to changes in federal law. Regulation 15 was implemented by administrative order on June 7, 1982,150 and both regulations were formally published on April I, 1983. 151 The balance of this
article will describe these regulations and will identify some potential
problems with their application. In particular, this article will explain
how these regulations represent the Rulemaking Committee's attempt
to achieve three goals: (1) promotion of federal-state coordination;
(2) modernization and simplification of the exemptions; and (3) reduction of compliance costs for small businesses attempting to raise capital
through exempt transactions.
The Rulemaking Committee's recognition of these three different
although related goals led it to produce not one but two exemptive regulations. The committee produced two rules rather than one because it
understood that one rule could not serve all of these goals with respect
to all issuers and all offerings. Furthermore, the Rulemaking Committee felt compelled to design an exemptive system that would account
for the changes effected by Regulation D. Regulations 9 and 15, therefore, were designed to have different, although complementary functions within the exemptive scheme. Before turning to individual
analysis of each of these exemptions, this subsection will provide a
brief overview of how the Rulemaking Committee defined the different
functions of these two rules. The key to this definition, perhaps, is a
perception of what Regulation D did and did not do.
Regulation D was desi~ned, in part, to make the federal exemptive
scheme more systematic. 1 2 The attempt was generally successful,
largely because Regulation D contains a common set of definitions and
exemptive conditions, and because it makes the strictness of the exemption proportional to the aggregate offering price. The more money the
issuer wants to raise, the more regulatory restraints will be applied;
conversely, the less money, the fewer restraints. Despite all of its systematic qualities, Regulation D did not totally transform the federal
exemptive system because Congress and the SEC allowed several important non-Regulation D exemptions to remain in existence after the
149. Id. § .02.04.15 [hereinafter cited as Reg. IS); see Sargent & Matney, Bluer Skies in
Maryland.' An Introduction to the New Maryland Exemptions for Limited and Private Offerings of Securities, 14 U. BALT. L.F. 22 (Fall 1983) (reviewing Reg. 9 and
Reg. IS); Sargent, Dealing with Maryland Blue Sky Reform: A Step-by-Step Case
Study and Guide, Daily Rec., Sept. 28, 1983, at 4, col. 1. The Division has published a brief explanatory release covering these regulations. Maryland Securities
Act Release No. 24, lA BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) ~ 30,566 (Dec. 15, 1983) [hereinafter cited as Release No. 24).
150. Order, In the Matter of Exemption by Coordination with SEC Rule 505 and 506,
Maryland Securities Commissioner (June 7, 1982) (Copy on file at the Division).
151. 10 Md. Admin. Reg. 55d1 (Mar. 18, 1983).
152. Securities Act Release No. 6389, (1981-1982 Transfer Binder) FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) ~ 83,106, at 84,908 (Mar. 8, 1982) [hereinafter cited as Release No. 6389);
see also Parnell, Kohl & Huff, supra note 43, at 682 (Regulation D is "an integrated and logically presented series of objective rules").
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adoption of the regulation. Notably, the statutory 4(2) exemption remains available outside the Rule 506 safe harbor. 153 Similarly, an issuer may still rely on the section 3(a)(11)/Rule 147 intrastate offering
exemption. In addition, the Regulation A and section 4(6) exemptions
remain available. 154 As a result, the Rulemaking Committee was faced
with the task of considering the appropriate state treatment of transactions exempted at the federal level under the statutory 4(2) exemption,
section 4(6), Rule 147, and Regulation A as well as under one of the
three Regulation D exemptions.
Regulation A and section 4(6) presented little difficulty for several
reasons. First, Regulation A offerings could be registered by coordination in Maryland. 155 Second, the relatively insignificant section 4(6)
exemption is primarily useful for smaller placements to institutional
investors,156 which can be exempted under Maryland's statutory institutional offering exemption. 157 The statutory 4(2) and Rule 147 exemptions, however, presented more challenging problems. These problems
had to be resolved in tandem with the issue of defining a state approach
to the different Regulation D exemptions. The Rulemaking Committee's resolution reflected its three interrelated goals of promoting federal-state coordination, modernizing and simplifying the state law, and
reducing small business compliance costs. The net result was two new
exemptive rules.
Regulation 15 is the key to the system. It permits exemption by
153. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501 to .506 preliminary note 4; Release No. 6389, supra note 152,
~ 83,106, at 84,910.
154. When the SEC proposed Regulation D it announced its intent to consider the
feasibility of eliminating Regulation A. Securities Act Release No. 6339, [19811982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) ~ 83,014, at 84,458 (Aug. 7, 1981)
[hereinafter cited as Release No. 6339]. The response of the bar to this suggestion
was decidedly negative. See Comment Letter of Members of the ABA Section of
Corporation, Banking, and Business Law of the American Bar Association, at 15,
SEC File No. S7-891 (Nov. II, 1981) [hereinafter cited as Comment Letter].
155. MD. CORPS. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. § 11-503(d) (1975).
156. Since the SEC's 1982 publication ofa rule defining the term "accredited investor"
for purposes of § 4(6) (17 C.F.R. § 230.215 (1983)), securities may be sold under
§ 4(6) to natural persons. This has made § 4(6) more useful than before. Cf. L.
Loss, supra note 76, at 348-49 (suggesting that § 4(6) has limited utility). Although the exemption may still be largely redundant, it could be a useful alternative to Rule 505 in some circumstances because: (I) it does not require delivery of
a disclosure document; (2) it contains no "bad boy" disqualifications; and (3) offerings made during the prior 12 months under a section 3(b) exemption do not
have to be aggregated for purposes of calculating the § 4(6) aggregate offering
price. See H. BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 76, at xliv. If an issuer sells securities
under § 4(6) to other than institutional investors, however, the state exemption for
offers and sales solely to these investors will not be available. See MD. CORPS. &
ASS'NS CODE ANN. § 11-602(8) (1975). In Maryland, the offering will have to be
registered or meet the exemptive conditions of Reg. 9. In view of the liberal terms
of the federal exemption, this seems to be an appropriate alternative at the state
level. For a discussion of the development of § 4(6) and Rule 215, see Helman,
The Sophisticated Accredited Investor, 14 REV. SEC. REG. 861 (1981).
157. MD. CORPS. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. § 11-602(8) (Supp. 1984).
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coordination with Rules 505 and 506. An offering made in compliance
with Rule 505 or 506 will be exempt under section 11-602(15) of the
Act provided a simple notice filing is made with the Division and two
additional, but relatively minor, conditions are satisfied. 158 The crux of
the state exemption, therefore, is compliance with the requirements of
either Rule 505 or 506. Rules 505 and 506 are perhaps the most important bases for interstate exempt offerings; exemption by coordination
under Regulation 15 allows those offerings to proceed in Maryland
without the need to restructure or restrict the offering except in relatively minor ways.159 This promotion of federal-state coordination,
moreover, is accomplished through a simple cross-reference. As a re158. See infra text accompanying notes 189-216.
159. The Maryland device of exemption by coordination should be compared to the
Uniform Limited Offering Exemption (ULOE) adopted by NASAA. I BLUE SKY
L. REP. (CCH) ~ 5294 (revised version adopted Sept. 21, 1983). Since 1981
NASAA has been trying to develop an exemption for limited and private offerings
that could be adopted on a uniform basis by its members. See Release No. 6339,
supra note 154, ~ 83,014 at 84,458. The goal of the project was "to reduce the
burdens on small issuers by eliminating in most instances the multiplicity of regulations imposed at both the state and federal levels." Id. ULOE has gone through
numerous drafts and has been the subject of criticism from within NASAA, see
NASAA Memorandum, supra note 39, and without, see Halloran & Linderman,
supra note 14, at 165-74.
In comparison to Reg. IS, NASAA's current ULOE is a more tentative approach to exemption by coordination. The basic problem is that ULOE still contains conditions reflecting regulatory concerns that the SEC has either rejected or
deemphasized. For example, ULOE permits the payment of sales remuneration
only to persons appropriately registered in the state. ULOE ~ LA., I BLUE SKY L.
REp. (CCH) ~ 5294 (revised version adopted Sept. 21, 1983); if. ULOE ~ 1. Ann.
2-3 (identifying certain options). The SEC proposed a similar restriction in its
original version of Regulation 0, see Release No. 6339, supra note 154, but that
restriction was dropped from the final version. Reg. 15 imposes a less stringent
remuneration restriction than that set forth in ULOE. See MD. ADMIN. CODE tit.
.02, § .02.04.15(B)(3) (1984). In addition, section D of ULOE requires the issuer
to meet sophistication and risk-bearing suitability standards for all nonaccredited
investors. It is noteworthy that an earlier version of ULOE contemplated additional individual suitability standards for the accredited investors as well. See
NASAA Memorandum, supra note 39, at 7. In contrast, neither Rule 505 nor
Reg. 15 impose any suitability standards on nonaccredited investors, and Rule
506 does not require risk-bearing suitability for these investors. Furthermore, section C of ULOE would permit a state to require either pre- or post-commencement notice filing. ULOE ~ C n.4, 1 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) ~ 5294 (revised
version adopted Sept. 21, 1983). Both Regulation D and Reg. 15 require only
post-commencement filing. Finally, ULOE contemplates coordination with only
Rule 505 offerings. Although explanatory footnote I to ULOE suggests that "[i]n
those states where facts and circumstances permit, it would not be inconsistent
with the regulatory objectives of this exemption" to coordinate with Rule 506,
ULOE itself does not permit this coordination. Furthermore, ULOE footnote 1
contains language highly critical of the use of Rule 506 in connection with tax
shelter investments.
Reg. 15 represents a more direct approach to coordination since it: (1) expressly coordinates with Rule 506 as well as Rule 505; (2) imposes no additional
suitability standards; and (3) requires only post-commencement notice filing. It
adds to Rules 505 and 506 only through imposing a restriction on remuneration (a
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suit, counsel need not read through a multipage rule to determine that
a substantial degree of coordination is intended. The major benefit of
coordination and simplification, finally, is reduction of compliance
costs-a boon to all issuers, especially small business issuers, upon
whose smaller offerings compliance costs fall with a disproportionately
greater weight. 160
The Rulemaking Committee recognized, however, that state exemption by coordination would not be appropriate with respect to all
federal exemptions. In particular, it recognized that the basis of the
Rule 504 exemption was deferral to state regulation. Rule 504 represents a decision by the SEC to remove significant federal regulatory
restraints from certain smaller offerings because those offerings are de
minimis from the federal perspective, and because they could and
would be regulated by the states. 161 The SEC contemplated that those
offerings would be either state registered or subjected to a stricter state
exemption; the SEC did not contemplate that Rule 504 would be the
basis for a wholly coordinated state exemption. The Rulemaking Committee gave effect to the SEC's recommendation by extending Regulation 15 exemption by coordination only to Rule 505 and 506 offerings,
thereby recognizing that a state exemption for quasi-public offerings
with an aggregate offering price of $500,000 to an unlimited number of
offerees and purchasers without any kind of mandatory disclosure or
suitability standards would seriously threaten Maryland investors.
Similarly, the Rulemaking Committee decided that exemption by
coordination would not work for Rule 147 and section 4(2) exemptions.
The Rule 147 problem was similar to the Rule 504 problem; the basis
for the intrastate offering exemption is deferral to state regulation, as
the SEC made clear in its explanatory release accompanying Rule
147.162 Exemption by coordination with Rule 147 made no sense conceptually or as a matter of policy.
The question of coordination with the statutory section 4(2) exemption was different because that exemption does not represent a simless stringent one than ULOE's) and some special "bad boy" disqualifications
similar to those imposed by ULOE. See infra text accompanying notes 211-16.
Therefore, it is perhaps fair to conclude that ULOE represents an important
step toward interstate uniformity and federal-state coordination, but that Reg. 15
represents a more complete realization of the principle of exemption by coordination. For a more detailed discussion of ULOE, see Keller, Uniform Limited Offering Exemption, in BLUE SKY LAWS: STATE REGULATION OF SECURITIES (J.
Halperin & H. Makens eds. 1984).
160. See Release No. 6389, supra note 152, ~ 83,106, at 84,908; SEC, SEC GOVERNMENT BUSINESS FORUM ON SMALL BUSINESS CAPITAL FORMATION 44-49 (Nov.
1982) [hereinafter cited as SEC FORUM).
161. Release No. 6389, supra note 152, ~ 83,106, at 84,909; Release No. 6339, supra
note 154, ~ 83,014, at 84,458; see a/so Release No. 24, supra note 149, ~ 30,566, at
25,581 (SEC deferred to the states for regulation of Rule 504 offerings).
162. Securities Act Release No. 5450, I FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) ~ 2340, at 2611-12
(Jan. 7, 1979).
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pIe deferral to state regulation. The difficulties in coordinating with
section 4(2) were more complex. Particularly troublesome was the elusiveness of the exemption. Because section 4(2) law is still a nonsystematic combination of decisional law, administrative interpretation,
and lawyers' rules of thumb, it is difficult to determine exactly when the
statutory exemption exists. 163 Since one of the purposes of the 1981
legislation was elimination of uncertainty and promotion of predictability through administrative rule making, the elusive statutory exemption seemed to fit poorly with the coordinating device. Furthermore,
the exemption still depends upon some outmoded concepts, notably offeree suitability and stringent disclosure requirements. 164 Accordingly,
section 11-602(15) only permits coordination with a rule or regulation
adopted under section 4(2).
The question thus became what should be done at the state level
with Rule 504, Rule 147, and section 4(2) offerings. The issuer could
register those shares by qualification,165 but it seemed inappropriate to
force all these offerings into registration. As an alternative, the
Rulemaking Committee provided Regulation 9, which was designed
for use with offerings under any of those three exemptions. It is a mold
into which those offerings can be poured to qualify for a state exemption. Regulation 9 will be analyzed in detail below, but a few key
points about its relationship with Regulation 15 and the federal exemptions must be emphasized here.
First, Regulation 9 is not a coordinating exemption. Its availability does not depend upon qualification for some federal exemption.
The issuer does not have to establish a Rule 504, Rule 147, section 4(2),
or any other federal exemption to use it. It is simply available for use in
connection with offerings federally exempted on anyone of those bases.
Conversely, qualification under one of those federal exemptions does
not automatically entitle the issuer to the Regulation 9 exemption; instead, compliance with each of the conditions of Regulation 9 is required. Counsel thus should not regard Regulation 9's use of
Regulation D terminology and concepts as implying "coordination" in
the Regulation 15 meaning of that word. The Ru1emaking Committee
borrowed terminology and concepts from Regulation D because some
aspects of that regulation could be put to use in Regulation 9, and that
is the only connection between those two regu1ations. 166
Second, Regulation 9 was intended to be a simple exemption for
use principally by small business. Although it will probably be used
163.
164.
165.
166.

See Section 4(2) and Statutory Law, supra note 104, at 486, 489.
See Nimkin, supra note 78, at 865-67.
MD. CORPS. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. § 11-504 (1975).
The use of Regulation D terminology and concepts in Reg. 9 makes SEC interpretation of Regulation D relevant to Division interpretation of Reg. 9. Those interpretations, however, are merely relevant, because nothing in Reg. 9 makes them
automatically binding on the Division. Accordingly, they will become binding
only if the Division adopts them as such.
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most often in connection with Rule 504 offerings,167 it is available to
other issuers and is not exclusively a mechanism for small business capital formation.
Third, although Regulation 9 implements the section 11-602(9) exemption, it is not merely a safe harbor. It is the exclusive means of
gaining that exemption, except through order of the Commissioner.
The relationship of Regulation 9 and section 11-602(9) thus does not
parallel the relationship of Rule 506 and section 4(2).
In sum, Regulations 9 and 15 have different functions. Regulation
15 is a coordinating device that permits Rule 505 and 506 transactions
to proceed in Maryland without incurring substantial additional compliance costs. Regulation 9 is not a coordinating device as such, but is
designed for use in connection with federally exempted offerings that
can meet its specific conditions. It was intended to be especially useful
for Rule 504 offerings that the issuer does not wish to register in Maryland. Because it is a relatively simple exemption, small business should
find it to be an inexpensive means of raising capital in Maryland. If
counsel is sensitive to the different functions of these two regulations,
the choice of exemption in Maryland should be easy to make.
C

Regulation 15: Exemption by Coordination

1.

Incorporation by Reference of Federal Law

Regulation 15, on its surface, is simple. Section A states the exemption: "Offers and sales of securities that satisfy the conditions and
limitations in [section] B of this regulation shall be exempt under Corporations and Associations Article, [section] 11-602(15)."168 The crucial substantive provisions of Regulation 15 are located in section B.
Subsection B(I) sets out the coordinating device. The offer or sale must
be "part of an offering which is made in compliance with Rule 505 or
506 (17 C.F.R. Parts 230.505 or 506, incorporated herein by reference)
as such rules may be amended from time to time."169
Crucial to this exemption is the reference to Rules 505 and 506 as
they currently exist and as they may be amended in the future. This
device should permit substantial coordination between the federal and
state exemptions. Indeed, the basis of the state exemption is establishment of the federal exemption. This premise is also expressed in subsection B(2), which characterizes the issuer's mandatory filing of the
SEC Form D as "the issuer's representation and affirmation to the Di167. While Reg. 9 was not adopted on a uniform basis with any other state, it still
provides a form of exemption useful in connection with a Rule 504 offering. It is
thus a step toward the recommendation stated in November 1982 by the SEC
Government-Business Forum on Small Business Capital Formation. See SEC
FORUM, supra note 160, at 60-61.
168. MD. ADMIN. CODE tit. .02, § .02.04.15A (1984).
169. Id. § .02.04. 15B(l).
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vision that it has complied with SEC Rule 505 or 506."170
It must be emphasized, however, that the express incorporation by
reference of Rules 505 and 506 means that those rules themselves are
technically part of Maryland law. If that is the case, the Division may
be entitled to interpret Rules 505 and 506 for purposes of Regulation 15
in a manner different from the SEC or the federal courts. The practical
problem created is the risk that an issuer could establish a Rule 505 or
506 exemption for purposes of federal law but then be denied a Regulation 15 exemption because the Division interprets Rule 505 or 506
more restrictively. Because Regulation 15 expressly makes those rules
part of state law, inconsistent state interpretations of Rules 505 and 506
as state law are possible.
Although this theoretical possibility is created by the language of
incorporation by reference, and although it may give the Division some
useful flexibility in responding to sudden or questionable changes in
SEC interpretation, it seems wholly inconsistent with the basic purpose
of Regulation 15. That purpose is to make the state exemption hinge
upon: (I) the establishment ofthe/ederalexemption under federal law;
and (2) the issuer's satisfaction of the three additional conditions specifically stated within the rule. The whole purpose of "exemption by
coordination" is elimination of duplicative or unnecessarily inconsistent state regulation in the context of certain exempt transactions; the
purpose is not the creation of state variants of Rules 505 or 506. 171 The
creation of these state variants would be especially troublesome if their
character could be determined only from no-action letters, orders pursuant to administrative hearings, or more informal policy statements.
Although the Division will probably exhibit its traditional restraint in
this regard, it may be appropriate to amend Regulation 15 by deleting
the phrase "incorporated herein by reference" from subsection B(l). If
that is done, it will be more clear that the state exemption depends
upon establishment of the federal exemption under federal law.
2.

The Problem of Delegation

Regulation 15's coordination of the state exemption with the federal exemption also generates the more serious problem of delegation.
That problem arises because subsection B(I) refers to Rules 505 and
506 as they "may be amended from time to time." In essence, state law
170. Id. § .02.04.15B(2).
171. It is noteworthy that neither the Rulemaking Committee's drafts nor the Division's proposed version of Regulation 15B(1) contained the words "incorporated
herein by reference." The language was added by the Division apparently in response to concerns of the Division of State Documents about potential delegation
problems. See Letter of Dennis M. Sweeney, Assistant Attorney General, to Robert J. Colborn, Division of State Documents (Jan. 17, 1983) [hereinafter cited as
Sweeney Letter). As the discussion below will show, because there should be no
delegation problem under Reg. 15, the "incorporated herein by reference" language is superfluous. See infra text accompanying notes 172-88.
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has been tied to future federal law; if Regulation D is amended by the
SEC, the basis for exemption under state law will change. There is
some risk that this could be regarded as an unconstitutional delegation
of state authority to the SEC, because the delegation doctrine has been
interpreted to mean that the state law cannot be pegged to "changes in
the federal laws or regulations to occur in the future."172
The main problem here is not with section 11-602(15), Regulation
15's enabling statute, despite that section's exemption of transactions
"now or hereafter" 173 exempted under section 4(2) or 3(b) of the 1933
Act. This reliance on future federal law, while questionable, is not necessarily invalid on delegation grounds because it will occur only to the
extent the Commissioner by rule or order permits. The statute contemplates that the state agency, and not the federal government, will ultimately determine the effect of changes in federal law on the state
exemption. Section 11-602(15) thus should be considered valid under
State v. Ciccarelli, a case decided by the Court of Special Appeals of
Maryland in 1983. 174 The Ciccarelli court rejected a delegation challenge to a Maryland statute that classified as "controlled dangerous
substances" materials that had been so designated by federal authorities and to which no objection was made by the Maryland Department
of Health and Mental Hygiene. 175 The court specifically rejected the
defendant's contention that this section allowed the federal agency to
create state law. 176
The court held first that the statutory reservation of a thirty day
period in which the state agency could decide whether to object to the
state classification of the federally designated substance meant that "[i]t
is the state agency, not the federal one, that makes the final determination."177 Section 11-602(15) even more clearly relies on state administrative action; a federal rule under sections 4(2) and 3(b) will become
the basis for a state exemption only if the Commissioner affirmatively
acts. The Commissioner's mere failure to object will not trigger coordination with the new federal rule.
The Cicarelli court then held that the statute in question was valid
because it would "guide and restrain" the agency's exercise of discre172. Lee v. State, 635 P.2d 1282, 1286 (Mont. 1981); e.g., State v. Williams, 119 Ariz.
595,583 P.2d 251 (1978); State v. Johnson, 84 S.D. 556, 173 N.W.2d 894 (1970);
People v. DeSilva, 32 Mich. App. 707, 189 N.W.2d 362 (1971); Homer's Market,
Inc. v. Tri-County Metropolitan Transp. Dist., 21 Or. App. 288, 467 P.2d 671,
aJFd, 256 Or. 124,471 P.2d 798 (1970); Yelle v. Bishop, 55 Wash. 2d 286,347 P.2d
1081 (1959).
173. MD. CORPS. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. § 11-602(15) (Supp. 1984).
174. State v. Ciccarelli, 55 Md. App. 150,461 A.2d 550 (1983); Mason v. State, 12 Md.
App. 655,280 A.2d 753, cerl. denied, 263 Md. 717 (1971).
175. Ciccarelli, 55 Md. App. at 154,461 A.2d at 553.
176. Id. at 154,461 A.2d at 553.
177. Id. at 156,461 A.2d at 554. The court expressly approved a similar decision by
the Supreme Court of Missouri in State v. Thompson, 627 S.W.2d 298 (Mo. 1982).
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tion. l78 It would do so because it stated specific criteria for the agency
to consider when it decides whether to object to inclusion on the state
schedule of a federally designated substance. 179 In contrast, section 11602(15) does not state specific criteria for the Commissioner to consider
when deciding whether to effect coordination with federal law. A strict
application of Ciccarellis "guide and restrain" concept might make
section 11-602(15) questionable. It is possible to defend section 11602(15), however, on the ground that the legislative history of the entire
Act makes clear that the fundamental policy of the statute is to ensure
maximum coordination of state and federal securities regulation while
continuing to protect Maryland investors. This approach to blue sky
law is clearly expressed in the Study Committee's Report, which explains how the Act can help prevent certain specified abuses while following SEC disclosure policy rather than the Uniform Act's merit
approach, by allowing Regulation A offerings to be registered by coordination, and by making the state private offering exemption more consistent with the federal exemption. 180 Because a court may look to
legislative history to determine whether the legislature has performed
the essential function "of determining basic legislative policy and formulating a rule of conduct,"181 the requisite legislative guidance for
and restraint on administrative action under section 11-602(15) may
exist. For these reasons, section 11-602(15) is probably not defective on
delegation grounds.
Regulation l5's implementation of section 11-602(15), however,
presents a more complicated issue. Subsection B(l) of Regulation 15
makes clear that an amended Rule 505 or 506 will still be the basis for
a Regulation 15 exemption. There is no requirement that the Commissioner evaluate the changed federal law to determine whether it should
continue to serve as a basis for coordination. Similarly, the regulation
contains no proviso that amended versions of the federal rules will
serve as a basis for the exemption unless the Commissioner objects
thereto, nor any reference to a waiting period after which the amended
federal law will become applicable unless the Commissioner objects.
The continued coordination with future amended versions of Rules 505
and 506 is practically automatic.
Because Ciccarelli requires the state agency and not the federal
agency to make the final determination, the regulation implementing
section 11-602(15) may have delegated an unconstitutional quantum of
authority to the SEC. If Regulation 15 makes the Division a "rubber
stamp" with respect to changes in Rules 505 and 506, it is vulnerable
178. Ciccarelli, 55 Md. App. at 156,461 A.2d at 554 (citing Mason v. State, 12 Md.
App. 655, 675-76, 280 A.2d 753,766, cerl. denied, 263 Md. 717 (1971)).
179. Ciccarelli, 55 Md. App. at 155-56,461 A.2d at 554.
180. See supra text accompanying notes 92-103.
181. Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Connally, 337 F. Supp. 737, 746 (D.D.C. 1971).
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under Cicarelli's application of the delegation doctrine. I82
Although the regulation may be vulnerable, it is not necessarily
invalid. If prospective application of future amended versions of Rules
505 and 506 is deemed an impermissible delegation, the court may
sever the offending provision and thereby prohibit coordination with
the future versions of Rules 505 and 506 while permitting cordination
with the version in effect at the time of publication. 183
Furthermore, Regulation 15 is merely an administrative rule. If
Rules 505 or 506 are amended in a manner that would make exemption
by coordination inappropriate, the Division can revise the regulation .
.Legislative action would be unnecessary, as it would be if Regulation
15 were a statute. Because the Division can respond to changes in federallaw more rapidly and efficiently than the General Assembly, the
degree of actual delegation to the SEC is proportionately less than it
would be if section 11-602(15) were a self-executing statutory exemption that did not require administrative implementation by rulemaking.
Finally, substantial considerations of public policy may make rigid
adherence to the delegation doctrine both unnecessary and counterproductive. 184 As Congress,185 the SEC,186 and state securities administrators l87 have recognized, inconsistent federal-state regulation of
limited and private offerings may impose an unnecessary restraint on
capital formation. The restraint results from three interrelated
problems: (1) the compliance costs generated by the need to identify
and understand additional or different state exemptive requirements;
(2) the compliance costs produced by the delays incident to multistate
blue sky compliance; and (3) the burden of restructuring a transaction
eligible for a federal exemption to qualify for a more restrictive or at
least different state exemption. The exemption by coordination device
is intended to reduce these restraints by promoting consistency in exemptive policies and techniques. Exemption by coordination will be
more effective, however, if the Division permits virtually automatic coordination with amended versions of Rules 505 and 506. If this coordi182. See Ciccarelli, 55 Md. App. at 158 n.4, 461 A.2d at 555 n.4. The Ciccarelli court
distinguished State v. Rodriquez, 397 So. 2d 1084 (La. 1980), in which the stricken
statute had provided that the secretary of the appropriate state agency shall add
any substance to the controlled list if the federal Drug Enforcement Agency classified it as controlled. In Rodriquez, "[tJhe secretary of the state agency was but a
'rubber stamp', divested of any discretion in the matter." Ciccarelli, 55 Md. App.
at 158,461 A.2d at 555.
183. See People v. DeSilva, 32 Mich. App. 707, 189 N.W.2d 362 (1971).
184. For an argument that the delegation doctrine should not be applied in a rigid
manner, and that state adoption of future federal law should be considered in
light of the substantive regulatory policies at issue in the area subject to concurrent state and federal regulation, see Rochvarg, State Adoption of Federal LawLegislative Abdication or Reasoned Policymaking?, 36 ADMIN. L. REV. 277 (1984).
185. See Securities Act of 1933 § 19(c), 15 U.S.C. § 77s(c) (1982).
186. See Release No. 6339, supra note 154, ~ 83,014; SEC FORUM, supra note 160, at
55-61.
187. See NASAA ULOE (1983), I BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) ~ 5294 (Sept. 21, 1983).
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nation is not permitted, serious disparities between state and federal
law may develop. 188
The prevention of a time lag between federal and state changes
will prevent temporary (and not so temporary) interference with the
efficient functioning of the coordination device. It will also simplify the
administrative task. The Commissioner will not have to carry out the
rulemaking process every time the SEC amends Regulation D so as to
update Regulation 15. That process will need to be initiated only if the
Commissioner wants to further condition the coordination exemption
because of changes in federal law. Neither Regulation 15 nor section
Il-602( 15) would prevent the Commissioner from exercising discretion
in that regard.
In addition, automatic coordination with amended versions of the
federal rules is not an abdication of the Division's responsibility to protect Maryland investors. The federal rules in question will be revised
by an agency with both substantial expertise and a traditional concern
for the needs of investors. If automatic coordination can reduce the
compliance costs associated with inconsistent state regulation without
undermining the Division's ability to protect Maryland investors, then
the delegation problem should not prove fatal.
The major interpretative and policy problems with Regulation 15
are thus created by subsection B(I). A summary of the rest of the exemption, however, will reveal a few other notable issues.
3.

The Filing Requirement: A Trap for the Unwary?

Subsection B(2) requires the issuer to file with the Division "not
later than 15 days after the first sale of securities under this regulation,
a manually signed notice on completed SEC Form D ... together with
a $100 check."189 There are two points to note about this apparently
innocuous notice filing provision. First, the filing must be made not
. later than fifteen days after the first sale of securities "under this regulation." Sales "under this regulation" are, obviously, the sales made in
Maryland. Because this filing is a requirement of Maryland law, the
Division is not bound by SEC interpretations of when a sale occurs
188. The Division recognized this possibility in one of its internal documents:
Experience has indicated that regulations and forms change at the federal level more frequently and with greater speed than such changes at
the state level. The time lag which would result from forcing the State to
continually play "catch-up-ball" with regard to state regulations intended to fully coordinate with regard to certain federal regulations is
likely to result only in diminished confidence in, and compliance with,
the state regulatory structure. In such a case there could be no assurance
that the state regulations have not been caught in a "time-warp" in its
efforts to keep pace with changes at the federal level.
Sweeney Letter, supra note 171, at 3.
189. MD. ADMIN. CODE tit. .02, § .02.04.15B(2) (1984).
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under Regulation D.190 The Division thus could develop a more or less
restrictive definition of when the first sale occurs.
Second, the notice filing requirement is a condition of the exemption. Failure to satisfy this simple requirement in a timely fashion can
result in loss of the exemption, just as a failure to file Form D with the
SEC can result in loss of the Regulation D exemption. 191 This severe
penalty arguably must exist if the Division is to be able to monitor all
Regulation 15 transactions for misuse of the exemption. It is questionable, however, whether the issuer should incur this kind of penalty192
for failure to make a notice filing or failure to make it in a timely fashion. Regulation 15's filing requirement is easier to comply with than
Regulation D'S193 because the Maryland rule requires only one filing,
but the use of the filing as a condition of the exemption perhaps needs
reexamination. In any event, issuer's counsel should keep well aware
of this simple, but stringent requirement.
4.

Restrictions on Remuneration

Subsection B(2) imposes an additional filing requirement to that
imposed by Regulation D. Subsection B(3), however, imposes a condition foreign to Regulation D-a restriction on the persons the issuer
may remunerate for their sales efforts.194 Specifically, a Rule 505 or
506 offering may be exempted in Maryland under Regulation 15 only if
any sales remuneration is paid exclusively to the persons designated in
subsections B(3)(a)-(b). This restriction on remuneration represents
not only an additional state requirement superimposed on the federal
requirements of Rules 505 and 506, but also a departure from Rule S-7,
which never imposed any restrictions on remuneration. Subsection
B(3) provides that remuneration for selling efforts may be paid only to
a broker-dealer that the issuer reasonably believes is registered in
Maryland, or:
(b) To a natural person who the issuer reasonably believes
has not received a commission or similar remuneratIOn for ef190. The SEC has issued a set of interpretations of when the Form D should be filed.
See Securities Act Release No. 6455, I FED. SEC. L. REp. (CCH) ~ 2380, at 263717 (questions 82-84) (Mar. 3, 1983). The Division currently follows the SEC in
consldering the "first sale" to occur "when the subscription agreement is delivered
to the issuer or its representative or when a purchaser's check is delivered to the
issuer or its representative, whichever occurs first." Release No. 24, supra note
149, ~ 30,566, at 25,583-84.
191. Release No. 6339, supra note 154, ~ 83,014.
192. See Kripke, supra note 78, at 851; Schneider, supra note 78, at 988.
193. Rule 503 requires the issuer to file a notice of sale on Form D not later than 15
days after the first sale, every six months thereafter, and no later than 30 days
after the last sale. 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(a)(I)-(3) (1983).
194. The proposed version of Regulation D contained a restriction on remuneration.
See Release No. 6339, supra note 154, ~ 83,014, at 84,464-65. The restriction was
deleted from the final version. See Release No. 6389, supra note 152, ~ 83,106, at
84,910.
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fecting any sale of securities on behalf of more than one other
issuer within a 12-month period immediately precedins the
first sale by that person in the offering being made in rehance
on this regulation. 195
It should be emphasized that this restriction applies not only to
classic brokers' sales commissions, but also to more unconventional arrangements. This approach reflects current blue sky decisional law,
which has tended to give a broad reading to state restrictions on remuneration. 196 Subsection B(3), however, is still a relatively mild restriction on remuneration. Other states go much further and will either
absolutely prohibit remuneration,197 or will allow it to be paid only to
state registered broker-dealers. 198
As subsections B(2)(a)-(b) demonstrate, there are two categories of
persons to whom remuneration can be paid. The first category consists
of broker-dealers whom the issuer reasonably believes are registered
under the Act. The reasonable belief qualification could be important.
If a broker-dealer's registration is revoked during the course of the offering and before the broker-dealer stops offering and selling the securities, the qualification might prevent loss of the exemption. 199
The second category essentially consists of issuers' agents who
have not slipped over the line into the status of unregistered brokerdealers. This concept needs some explanation. Section 11IOI(c)(2)(i)2°O of the Act states that the term "broker-dealer" does not
include an "agent. " Under section 11-10 I (b)( I), "agent" means "an individua other than a broker-dealer who represents an issuer in effecting or attempting to effect purchases or sales of securities."201 The
statute goes on, however, to exclude froni the definition of agent "an
individual who represents an issuer in: . . . (ii) effecting transactions
exempted by section 11_602."202 This sequence of definitions and ex19S. MD. ADMIN. CODE tit. .02, § .02.04.ISB(3) (1984).
196. See, e.g., Schultz v. Rector-Phillips-Morse, Inc., 261 Ark. 769, SS2 S.W.2d 4 (1977)
(excess profits on sale or lease to partnership constitute remuneration); Caldwell v.
Trans-Gulf Petroleum Corp., 322 So. 2d 171 (La. 1975) (fees paid to finders constitute remuneration); Prince v. Heritage Oil Co., 109 Mich. App. 189,311 N.W.2d
741 (1981) (retention of an interest in a partnership or a well at reduced or no
consideration constitutes remuneration); Petroleum Resources Dev. Corp. v. Day,
S8S P.2d 346 (Okla. 1978) (remuneration present even if sales commissions are
subsequently disallowed by issuer or promoter).
197. See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 203(d)(iii) (Purdon Supp. 1983-1984); PA. ADMIN. CODE § 203.041(g), reprinted in 2 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) ~ 48,43S, at
43,S09 (May II, 1974).
198. See MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. § 4SI.802(b)(9)(C) (West Supp. 1983-1984).
199. This does not intimate, however, that the issuer can avoid establishing a reasonable belief in the broker-dealer's registered status bifore it authorizes the brokerdealer to commence the offering. The Division, however, has not specifically defined the steps appropriate for the establishment of reasonable belief.
200. MD. CORPS. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. § I 1-101 (c)(2)(i) (197S).
201. Id. § ll-lOl(b)(I).
202. Id. § I 1-10 I (b)(3)(ii).
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clusions has suggested the following misconceived argument.
A natural person may represent numerous issuers during a relatively short period of time in the placement of securities exempted
under sections 11-602(9) or 11-602(15). That person, according to this
argument, is excluded from broker-dealer status because he is an issuer's agent, and also excluded from statutory agent status because he
is engaged only in transactions exempt under section 11-602. Exclusion
from each status would mean that this person is subject to neither broker-dealer nor agent registration.
The Division has correctly refused to countenance this argument.
In a 1974 release discussing the applicability of the broker-dealer registration provisions to transactions in limited partnership interests, the
Division stated that "persons who solicit limited partnership interests
on a private basis are by statute not considered [statutory] agents although they occupy the traditional common law agency position.
Hence such persons may not claim entitlement to the agent exclusion
from the definition of broker-dealer set forth in [section] 11101(b)(l)."203 These persons may be broker-dealers under section 11101(c)(1) if they are "engaged in the business of effecting transactions
in securities for the account of others. . . ."204 The Division clarified
the consequences of this position by stating in that same release that
any person:
whether he be a true statutory agent or a common law agent
who represents an issuer in a [section] 11-602(9) private transaction, is subject to a presumption that he is a broker-dealer if
he solicits limited partnership interests for and on behalf of
three or more issuers within a twelve month period. 205
In short, the representation of the third issuer in a twelve month
period creates the presumption that the person is engaged in the business of effecting transactions in securities for the account of others.
Subsection B(3)(b) is merely a new application of this presumption in a
different context. It has the effect of prohibiting the Regulation 15 issuer from remunerating persons who are presumably unregistered broker-dealers selling in violation of the Act.
Because subsection B(3) imposes an exemptive condition foreign
to both Regulation D and Rule S-7, it raises a question as to whether
this form of exemptive condition is appropriate. At the outset, it is important to note that the restriction is not all that severe. Although subsection B(3) employs a broad definition of remuneration, it is not an
absolute prohibition of remuneration or a statement that only registered persons may be remunerated. The issuer will thus be able to
203. Maryland Securities Act Release No. 18, lA BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH)
at 25,573 (May lO, 1974) [hereinafter cited as Release No. 18).
204. MD. CORPS. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. § ll-lOl(c)(l) (1975).
205. Release No. 18, supra note 203, ~ 30,560, at 25,573.

~

30,560,
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compensate its own personnel for their sales efforts without losing the
exemption. Similarly, the issuer will be able to retain personnel to engage in the sales effort, and will be able to compensate an accountant or
a lawyer for services in connection with the offering. The issuer need
only establish a reasonable belief that those persons have not been similarly compensated by more than one other issuer in the relevant time
period.
Subsection B(3) thus will not have the negative effects of an absolute prohibition or a limitation to registered persons-interference with
the issuer's ability to market sound securities, and encouragement of
less scrupulous issuers to compensate unregistered persons in a covert
or unconventional manner.206 In addition, it may produce a degree of
investor protection by encouraging the use of registered securities professionals who are subject to supervision by the Division,207 who must
make determinations as to the suitability of the investment for their
206. In a comment letter, the ABA stated:
We strongly oppose Rule 502(e) which makes the limited offering exemptions unavailable if any remuneration is given for solicitations or in
connection with sales to persons other than broker-dealers registered
under federal and state laws. While we recognize that many states prohibit the payment of remuneration in exempt limited offerings, we believe it is counterproductive for the Commission, which has been
charged by Congress to diminish the burdens of raising capital for small
business, to impose additional federal requirements in areas where none
previously existed in its regulations. Accordingly, we recommend that
Rule 502(e) be eliminated in its entirety. Issuers would be free to remunerate third parties in Regulation D offerings-whether they be brokerdealers, business finders, business brokers, or promoters, officers, directors, employees or shareholders of the issuer, or others.
We believe that the proposed restriction on remuneration would
have the following undesirable consequences:
(I) One effect of the proposal is to grant a monopoly in the exempt
limited offering ~arket to registered broker-dealers, a result we assume
was unintended. --We believe any such result is certainly unjustified.
Broker-dealers play an integral role in capital raising efforts as do promoters, business finders, business brokers (particularly in the context of
business combinations) and other persons who are compensated for their
solicitation efforts. Many, if not most, of those persons are neither registered nor required to be registered as broker-dealers under federal and
state law.
(2) It is not uncommon for small businesses seeking to raise capital to be unable to attract or afford registered broker-dealers. However,
since proposed Rule 502(e) prohibits the payment of compensation to
persons other than registered broker-dealers, another effect of the proposal is to force small businesses that wish to remunerate such persons to
register their offerings or abandon them.
(3) Another effect of the proposal is to cause persons who are compensated for solicitation or sales to register as broker-dealers even
though the nature of their activities in many circumstances does not subject them to registration under present federal and state law. We also
assume that this result was unintended.
ABA Comment Letter, supra note 154, at 42.
207. See MD. CORPS. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. §§ 11-401 to -417 (1975).
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customers, and who have fiduciary obligations to them?08 These persons thus may help police the transaction. Similarly, the limitations
may reinforce Regulation D's ban on general advertising and solicitation. 209 Furthermore, subsection B(3)(b) may have the effect of excluding from the sales effort persons who have demonstrated a lack of
concern with securities law compliance.
Subsection B(3) is thus a relatively mild restriction on remuneration that may help protect investors. A few questions, however, remain. First, it is unclear whether restrictions on remuneration actually
protect investors, because we do not know whether the persons who
may be compensated under section B(3) will actually "police the deal."
The SEC has not resolved this question, and it dropped from the final
version of Regulation D the restriction on remuneration that had appeared in the proposed version. 210 Second, how may the issuer establish reasonable belief that nonregistered agents have not represented
more than one other issuer within the relevant time period? What level
of due diligence on the part of the issuer is required? Is a questionnaire
sufficient, or will the issuer have to undertake some more rigorous inquiry? Finally, is it appropriate to use an issuer exemption to enforce
indirectly the broker-dealer registration requirement? In essence,
should the issuer bear the risk ofthe remunerated persons' non-compliance with that requirement? The restrictions on remuneration thus
raise questions of efficacy (do they really protect investors?), practicality (how can reasonable belief as to compensability be established?),
and policy (who should bear the risk of violation of the broker-dealer
registration requirement?). A period of experimentation may produce
some insight into the efficacy and practicability of these restrictions. If
it is determined that these restrictions are in fact practicable and provide a measure of investor protection, then it may be possible to decide
as a matter of policy that the issuer should bear some of the risk of
broker-dealer registration violations by the persons it has compensated.
5.

"Bad Boy" Disqualifications

Subsection B(4) also produces some important questions. That
provision sets out a series of so-called "bad boy" disqualifications. 21l
208.
209.
210.
211.

See No. 6339, supra note 154, ~ 83,014, at 84,464-65.
17 C.F.R. § 230.502(c) (1983).
See Release No. 6339, supra note 154, ~ 83,014, at 84,464-65.
Regulation 15 provides:
An exemption under this regulation is not available if the issuer,
any of its directors, officers, general partners, or beneficial owners of 10
percent or more of any class of its equity securities, any of its promoters
currently connected with it in any capacity, or any person (other than a
broker-dealer currently registered under Corporations and Associations
Article, § 11-405) which has been or will be paid or given, directly or
indirectly, any commission or similar remuneration for solicitation of
any prospective purchaser or in connection with sales of securities in
reliance on this regulation:
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In effect, it denies the exemption if the issuer, or any of its directors,
officers, general partners, beneficial owners of ten percent or more of
any class of the issuer's equity securities, promoters currently connected with the issuer in any capacity, or nonregistered recipients of
remuneration has been subject to specified judicial or administrative
actions within five years prior to the first sale of securities under Subsection B(4). All of the specified actions concern discipline for acts of a
fraudulent or deceitful nature. Two key points need to be made about
this condition.
First, it causes bad boy disqualifications to apply to Rule 506 offerings in Maryland. Rule 506 itself contains no such disqualifications;
Rule 505 is the only one of the three Regulation D exemptions that
contains bad boy provisions. 212
Second, the subsection B(4) disqualifications are somewhat
broader than the Rule 505 disqualifications. In particular, subsection
B(4) disqualifies the issuer when the specified persons have been convicted or are currently subjected to judicial restraint for false filings
with a state securities administrator, or are subject to a state administrative order entered by a state securities administrator in which fraud
or deceit was found. In short, subsection B(4) will disqualify an issuer
if a court or a state administrator has found that one of the specified
persons violated some state's securities law through a false filing or the
commission of fraud or deceit. The SEC's original version of Rule 505
had contained similar state bad boy disqualifications,213 but they were
(a) Has been convicted or has pleaded nolo contendere within 5 years
prior to the first sale in any offering in reliance on this regulation of any
felony or misdemeanor in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security or in connection with the making of any false filing with the
United States Securities and Exchange Commission or any state securities administrator, or of any felony involving fraud, or deceit, including
but not limited to, forgery, embezzlement, obtaining money under false
pretenses, larceny, conspiracy to defraud, or theft;
(b) Is subject to any order, judgment, or decree of any court of competent jUrisdiction temporarily or preliminarily restraining or enjoining, or
is subject to any order, judgment or decree of any court of competent
jurisdiction, entered within 5 years prior to the first sale in any offering
in reliance on this regulation, permanently restraining or enjoining that
person from engaging in or continuing any conduct or practice in connection with the making of any false filing with the United States Securities and Exchange Commission or any state securities administrator;
(c) Is subject to a United States Postal Service false representation order entered within 5 years prior to the first sale in any offering in reliance
on this regulation; or
(d) Is subject to any state administrative order entered by a state securities administrator in which fraud or deceit was found if the order was
entered within 5 years prior to the first sale in any offering in reliance on
this regulation.
MD. ADMIN. CODE tit ..02, § .02.04. 15B(4)(a)-(d) (1984).
212. 17 C.F.R. § 230.505(b)(2)(iii) (1983).
213. Release No. 6339, supra note 154, ~ 83,014, at 84,468.
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dropped from the adopted version. 214 In essence, subsection B(4) reinstates, for purposes of transactions in Maryland, disqualifications very
similar to those dropped by the SEC.
The imposition of bad boy disqualifications on Rule 506 transactions in Maryland and the engrafting of additional state disqualifications on Rule 505 transactions can best be described as a form of
indirect regulation. Instead of strictly limiting the number and nature
of the offerees and purchasers, Regulation 15 tries to keep the transactions honest by excluding from participation those persons with a record of securities law noncompliance. Regulation 15, however, arguably
should not have added state disqualifications to Rule 505 transactions
or applied any to Rule 506 transactions. The addition of these disqualifications may be viewed as inconsistent with the principle of exemption by coordination. 2ls This argument is plausible, but not
compelling. State securities administrators are often engaged in enforcement actions in which the SEC may play no role and about which
the federal agency may not even know. The crucial track record of
fraud or deceit may exist only at the state level. It thus may be reasonable to require the issuer to extend its due diligence inquiry to the state
administrations as well as to the SEC and the courts.
In any event, the potential harshness of subsection B(4) may be
mitigated by subsection B(5), which provides that "[d]isqualification
under B(4) does not apply to any transaction if the Commissioner determines that it is not inconsistent with the public interest that the exemption be available."216
1984)

D.

Regulation 9: A Noncoordinating Exemption
Regulation 9 was designed for use with transactions exempted on
some basis other than Rules 505 or 506. A summary of the regulation
will show how it is a flexible device adaptable to use in connection with
most Rule 504, Rule 147, and section 4(2) transactions.2 17
214. Release No. 6389, supra note 152, ~ 83,106, at 84,910.
215. The disqualification on the basis of a state administrative order may be especially
problematic in view of the state administrator's authority to issue cease and desist
orders. See, e.g., MD. CORPS. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. § I 1-70 1(a)(4) (Supp. 1984);
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 1 lOA, § 407A (West 1984). These very flexible enforcement tools may be exercised by the state administrator on an ex parte basis.
See Economou v. Wade, 515 F. Supp. 813 (S.D. Iowa 1980).
216. MD. ADMIN. CODE tit. .02, § .02.04.158(5) (1984). That subsection continues:
"This determination by the Commissioner shall be without prejudice to the Commissioner in any other proceeding or matter with respect to the issuer or any other
person."
One possible effect of the imposition of subsection 8(4)'s disqualifications on
Rule 506 transactions might be the occasional registration by qualification of
those offerings in Maryland. If one of the general partners in a limited partnership syndication, for example, is a firm with large numbers of officers or general
partners, registration in Maryland may be less time consuming than a due diligence survey of disciplinary records.
217. Of course, there may be problems with meeting both the federal and state exemp-
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As previously explained, Regulation 9 does not truly coordinate
with Regulation D.2l Its structure and terminology, however, reflect
the influence of that set of rules. This should not be a source of confusion. The borrowings from Regulation D are merely an acknowledgement of some of the useful aspects of that regulation; the availability of
the Regulation 9 exemption does not depend upon establishment of a
Regulation D exemption, and the establishment of a Regulation D exemption does not entitle the issuer to a Regulation 9 exemption. 2l9
Regulation 9 actually consists of two separate exemptions: the Local Issuer Exemption and the General Transactional Exemption. The
Local Issuer Exemption provides a very simple exemption for certain
local small business issuers, and the General Transactional Exemption
provides a somewhat more complex exemption for a broader class of
issuers. The rest of Regulation 9 sets out definitions and conditions
common to both exemptions. Since those definitions and conditions
apply throughout the Regulation, they should be examined first.
1.

Definitions

Section A of Regulation 9,220 like Rule 501 of Regulation D,221
sets forth definitions applicable throughout the regulation. Section B222
functions similarly to Rule 502,223 defining conditions applicable to all
transactions to be exempted under the regulation. Regulation 9's no-

218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.

tions in all cases. Regulation 9 is intentionally more restrictive than Rule 504.
See supra text accompanying note 161. An issuer who wishes to take full advantage of Rule 504's liberality thus may want to register by qualification in Maryland. State registration, of course, would allow the issuer to offer the Rule 504
securities through general solicitation and public advertising, and without restrictions on resale. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.504(b)(I) (1983).
Regulation 9 also imposes exemptive conditions that are not necessarily more
restrictive than those of Rule 147, but are quite different. They are different because they focus on the limited and private character of the offering rather than its
intrastate character. The issuer seeking both exemptions must therefore be able to
place the intrastate offering into a limited and private offering mold. Ordinarily,
that should not be very difficult. For a useful discussion of some of the complexities of the intrastate offering exemption, see Long, A Lawyer's Guide to the IntraState Exemption and Rule 147,24 DRAKE L. REV. 471 (1975).
The problem is reversed for statutory section 4(2) transactions. By abandoning offeree suitability requirements, deemphasizing the role of mandatory disclosure, and adopting the accredited investor concept, Regulation 9 created an
exemption considerably more liberal than that of statutory section 4(2). Thus, an
offering that takes full advantage of Regulation 9 may not be able to qualify
under section 4(2). This was, however, a potential problem under Rule S-7 as
well, see supra text accompanying notes 131-32, and never seemed to generate
great concern. This lack of concern perhaps reflects the tendency of issuers to
ensure federal compliance before worrying about blue sky compliance.
See supra text accompanying notes 165-67.
Id.
MD. ADMIN. CODE tit. .02, § .02.04.09A (1984).
17 C.F.R. § 230.501 (1983).
MD. ADMIN. CODE tit..02, § .02.04.09B (1984).
17 C.F.R. § 230.502 (1983).
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tice filing requirement, however, is stated within section B,224 rather
than stated separately in an equivalent to Regulation D's Rule 503. 225
Sections C and D of Regulation 9 are roughly parallel to Rules 504506; they concisely define the exemptions to which the preceding definitions and conditions apply. Section E has no analogue in Regulation
D, because it merely declares the unavailability of the exemption for
offerings registered under the 1933 Act or exempted under Regulation
A, Rule 505, or Rule 506. There is also no Regulation D equivalent to
Form MD-2, a disclosure document specifically designed for use with
some Regulation 9 offerings. The structural affinities between Regulation 9 and Regulation D are thus substantial, but it must be reemphasized that this is a state exemption that must be established as a matter
of state law. 226
Section A begins with a definition of "accredited investor."227 As
explained below, the question of whether a person is an accredited investor is relevant to the calculation of the number of purchasers allowed under the exemption,228 the determination of the issuer's
disclosure responsibilities,229 and the definition of "local issuer. "230
Since the definitions of accredited investor set forth in subsections
A(1)(a)-(h) are practically identical to those contained in Rule 501(a),
no extended summary and discussion of the different categories of accredited investor is needed. 231 It is necessary, however, to identify certain key differences in the state and federal definitions.
Subsection A(l)(d) tracks Rule 501(a)(4) in defining as an accredited investor "[a]ny director, executive officer, or general partner of the
issuer of the securities being offered or sold, or any director, executive
officer, or general partner of a general partner of that issuer. . . ."232
Subsection A(l)(d), however, goes on to broaden this category of accredited investor by including "any relative, spouse, or relative of the
spouse of any such individual specified in this paragraph who has the
224. MD. ADMIN. CODE tit. .02, § 02.04.09B(7) (1984).
225. 17 C.F.R. § 230.503 (1983).
226. Of course, although SEC and federal court interpretations of similar language in
Regulation D may be relevant in interpreting Regulation 9, those interpretations
are not binding on the Division or the Maryland courts.
227. MD. ADMIN. CODE tit. .02, § .02.04.09A(I) (1984).
228. See infra text accompanying notes 283-87.
229. See infra text accompanying notes 316-29.
230. See infra text accompanying notes 295-300.
231. The SEC has recently stated its position on some interpretive problems with the
definition of accredited investor. See Securities Act Release No. 6455, 17 C.F.R.
§ 231.6455 (Mar. 3, 1983) (questions 1-31). Recent SEC No-action Letters on accredited investor questions include: Smith, Barney, Upham, Harris & Co., [19821983 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) ~ 77,340 (July 14, 1982); Lola M.
Hale, Esq., [1982-1983 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) ~ 77,339 (July
I, 1982); Winthrop Fin. Co., [1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) ~
77,235 (June 25, 1982).
232. 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a)(4) (1983); MD. ADMIN. CODE tit. .02, § .02.04.09A(I)(a)
(1984).
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same principal residence as that individual."233 Similarly, Rule
501(a)(7) defines as an accredited investor "[a]ny natural person who
had an individual income in excess of $200,000 in each of the two most
recent years and who reasonably expects an income in excess of
$200,000 in the current year."234 Subsection A(I)(t) adds after the
words "individual income" the phrase "or an income combined with
the income ofthat person's spouse."235 Subsections A(l)(t) and A(I)(d)
represent modest attempts to broaden two of the important categories
of accredited investors. 236
The definition of accredited investor is followed by definitions of
"affiliate,"237 and "aggregate offering price,"238 both of which parallel
equivalent provisions in Rule 501 of Regulation D.239 Subsection A(4)
defines "beneficial owner" of a security to mean "any person with the
power to vote or direct the disposition of the security."240 This definition plays a role in subsection A(6)'s definition of "local issuer."241 The
definition of "local issuer" is the key to section C's Local Issuer Exemption, because only local issuers may use that exemption. 242 The definition of local issuer follows subsection A(5)'s definition of "executive
officer"243-a definition tracking Rule 501(t).244
Subsection A(7) provides a broad definition of "promoter."245 It
233.
234.
235.
236.

237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.

MD. ADMIN. CODE tit. .02, § .02.04.09A(1)(d) (1984).
17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a)(7).
MD. ADMIN. CODE tit. .02, § .02.04.09A(1)(f) (1984).
It may be appropriate in general to broaden the concept of accredited investor.
One way to do so might be by defining sophisticated investors as accredited, although this definition might be inconsistent with the other aspects of the definition
of accredited investor, all of which depend upon objective standards. At least one
commentator, however, has argued that this definition makes sense:
[M]y objection is to the fact that the definition of accredited investor
does not include a purchaser who specifically meets the stringent test of
rule 506 of being able, either alone or with one or more purchaser representatives, to have "such knowledge and experience in financial and
business matters that he is capable of evaluating the merits and risks of
the prospective investment." Such a person can fend for himself. A sale
to him is "one of those transactions where there is no practical need for
[the bill's] application or where the public benefits are too remote."
Kripke, supra note 78, at 836 (footnotes omitted).
MD. ADMIN. CODE tit..02, § .02.04.09A(2) (1984).
Id § .02.04.09A(3).
17 C.F.R. § 230.501(b)-(c) (1983).
MD. ADMIN. CODE tit. .02, § .02.04.09A(4) (1984).
Id § .02.04.09A(6); see infra text accompanying notes 295-300.
MD. ADMIN. CODE tit .. 02, § .02.04.09C (1984); see infra text accompanying notes
295-303.
MD. ADMIN. CODE tit. .02, § .02.04.09A(5) (1984).
17 C.F.R. § 230.501(f) (1983).
Regulation 9 states:
"Promoter" means:
(a) Any person who, acting alone or in conjunction with one or more
persons, directly or indirectly takes the initiative in founding and
organizing the business or enterprise of an issuer; or
(b) Any person who, in connection with the founding or organization
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encompasses both shareholders246 and non-shareholders. 247 This definition plays a key role in the bad boy disqualifications set forth in
subsection B(9)248 and the subsection D(3)(b)(i)249 "cheap stock" disclosure provisions of the General Transactional Exemption. 250 Subsection A(8) is an elaborate definition of "purchaser representative."251
Like Rule 50I(h) of Regulation D, subsection A(8) is designed to prevent conflicts of interest among the issuer, the purchaser, and the purchaser representative,252 and to ensure that the purchaser
representative actually has the ability to evaluate the investment. 253
The definition of purchaser representative ends with an "Agency Note"
advising the purchaser representative to consider the applicability of
the state and federal antifraud, broker-dealer, and investment adviser
provisions. 254 The concept of purchaser representative plays only a
limited role in Regulation 9; a purchaser representative can be used to
establish purchaser suitability for purposes of the disclosure requirements of the General Transactional Exemption under subsection
D(3)(a)(iii)(bb).255
2.

Conditions
Section B lists nine conditions applicable to all transactions to be

246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.

253.
254.

255.

of the business or enterprise of an issuer, directly or indirectly receives in consideration of services or property, or both services and
property, 10 percent or more of any class of securities of the issuer
or 10 percent or more of the proceeds from the sale of any class of
securities. However, a person who receives those securities or proceeds either solely as brokerage commissions or solely in consideration of property will not be deemed a promoter within the meaning
of this paragraph if the person does not otherwise take part in
founding and organizing the enterprise.
MD. ADMIN. CODE tit. .02, § .02.04.09A(7) (1984).
Id. § .02.04.09A(7)(b).
Id. § .02.04.09A(7)(a).
Id. § .02.04.09B(9).
Id. § .02.04.090(3)(b)(i).
Id. § .02.04.090.
Id. § .02.04.09A(8).
See id. § .02.04.09A(8)(a) (prohibiting reliance on a purchaser representative
connected with the issuer, except under specified circumstances); id.
§ .02.04.09A(8)(c) (mandating disclosure to investor of potential conflicts of
interest).
See id. § .02.04.09A(8)(b) (requiring purchaser representative to be able to evaluate the risks and merits of the investment).
The "Agency Note" states:
A person acting as a purchaser representative should consider the applicability of the broker-dealer registration and anti-fraud provision of
the Maryland Securities Act and of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
and the applicability of the Maryland Securities Act, Corporations and
Associations Article, § 11-302 and the Investment Advisers Act of 1940
to investment advisers.
MD. ADMIN. CODE tit. .02, § .02.04.09A(8) (1984).
MD. ADMIN. CODE tit. .02, § .02.04.090(3)(a)(iii)(bb) (1984).
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exempted under Regulation 9. Subsection B(l)(a)256 states the issuer's
basic option: compliance with either section C's Local Issuer Exemption or section D's General Transactional Exemption. The issuer must,
however, comply with all the conditions of subsection B, whichever option it follows. Subsection B(l)(a) also makes clear that "[t]he burden
of proving an exemption under the regulation is on the person claiming
the exemption."257 Subsection B(l)(b) mitigates the potentially harsh
effect of Regulation 9's status as an exclusive rule and not a safe harbor. 258 It does so by allowing an issuer to obtain an exemptive order
from the Commissioner by showing "[t]hat the transaction demonstrates substantial compliance in good faith with the conditions of the
regulation,"259 and "that the order would not be inconsistent with the
public interest."260 The key point is that the issuer who cannot satisfy
all of the regulation's requirements has the burden of persuading the
Commissioner that an exemption would still be appropriate. The standards governing the Commissioner's issuance of that order are broadly
stated, and permit a flexible response to different financing needs. This
kind of flexibility will be needed if the order mechanism is to function
as a release from the burden of the regulation's exclusivity. Although
subsection B(l )(b) is flexible, the issuer must still demonstrate "substantial compliance in good faith."261
Subsection B(2)262 applies the familiar concept of integration263 to
Regulation 9 transactions. The language of subsection B(2) is derived
from Rule 502(a), and provides similar six month safe harbors for offers and sales made more than six months before the commencement of
an offering under Regulation 9 and six months after completion of the
256. Id. § .02.04.098(1)(a).
257. This language reflects MD. CORPS. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. § 11-604 (1975): "In any
proceeding under this title, the burden of proving an exemption . . . is on the
person claiming it." The constitutionality of a similar provision in the Michigan
statute was sustained in People v. Dempster, 396 Mich. 700, 713-14, 242 N.W.2d
381, 388-89 (1976). For a discussion of Dempster, see MICHIGAN SECURITIES
REGULATION § 9.09G (c. Moscow & H. Makens eds. 1983). There is no parallel
case in Maryland. Cf. Hohensee v. State, 42 Md. App. 329, 339 n.19, 400 A.2d
455,460 n.19 (1979) (dictum) (suggesting that there may be a constitutional problem with section 11-604) (citing Evans v. State, 28 Md. App. 640, 349 A.2d 300
(1975), ajf'd, 278 Md. 197, 362 A.2d 629 (1976».
258. In contrast, MD. CORPS. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. § 11-602 (1975) and 1974 Rule S-7
had a safe harbor relationship. See supra text accompanying notes 133-46.
259. MD. ADMIN. CODE tit .. 02, § .02.04.098(l)(b)(i) (1984).
260. Id. § .02.04.098(1)(b)(ii).
261. Only experience with the Division's implementation of this provision will demonstrate the stringentness of this requirement.
262. MD. ADMIN. CODE tit. .02, § .02.04.098(2) (1984).
263. For discussion of the integration concept, see Deaktor, Integration of Securities
Offerings, 31 U. FLA. L. REV. 465 (1979); Integration of Partnership Offerings: A
Proposalfor Identifying a Discrete Offering, 37 8us. LAW. 1591 (1982) (position
paper of A8A Subcommittee on Partnerships, Trusts, and Unincorporated Associations [hereinafter cited as Integration]; Shapiro & Sachs, Integration Under
the Securities Act: Once an Exemption, Not Always, 31 MD. L. REV. 3 (1971).
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offering.264 Subsection B(2) further states that offers and sales made
within those six month periods, "depending on the particular facts and
circumstances, may be deemed to be 'integrated' with the offering."
The subsection does not indicate what "facts and circumstances" would
determine the question. The Division traditionally has taken a flexible
approach to this question and can be expected to draw upon the five
factor analysis applied by the SEC under section 4(2) and Regulation
D.265
Integration issues apparently have not created great concern in
Maryland, but the topic recently received considerable national attention as a result of SEC v. Murphy,266 a 1980 decision by the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. In Murphy, a corporate
promoter sold limited partnership interests in about thirty separate
cable television partnerships to approximately four hundred investors. 267 The court disregarded the limited partnerships' status as nominal issuers of the securities, integrated the offerings, characterized the
corporate promoter as the "issuer," and held that no section 4(2) exemption was available for the integrated offering.268 Murphy has led to
a serious attempt to define a safe harbor for discrete offerings by limited partnerships with affiliated sponsors;269 it may be appropriate for
264. The six month safe harbors apply if:
During those 6 month periods there are no offers or sales of securities by or for the issuer that are of the same or similar class as those
offered or sold under this regulation, other than those offers or sales of
securities under an employee benefit plan of the type referred to in Corporations and Associations Article, § 11-601(11) (1975).
MD. ADMIN. CODE tit. .02, § .02.04.09B(2) (1984).
265. In its "Note" to 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(a) (1983), the SEC states:
The following factors should be considered in determining whether
offers and sales should be integrated for purposes of the exemptions
under Regulation D:
(a) Whether the sales are part of a single plan of financing;
(b) Whether the sales involve issuance of the same class of
securities;
(c) Whether the sales have been made at or about the same time;
(d) Whether the same type of consideration is received; and
(e) Whether the sales are made for the same general purpose.
Id. This five factor analysis derived from Securities Act Release No. 4552, (1962)
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) ~~ 2770-2782, at 2918-21 (Nov. 6, 1962). In 1979, the
SEC staff announced that it would no longer issue no-action letters on integration
questions. Clover Fin. Corp., [1979 Transfer Binder) FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) ~
82,091 (Apr. 5, 1979).
266. 626 F.2d 633 (9th Cir. 1980).
267. Id. at 637.
268. Id. at 642-44.
269. The attempt was made by the ABA Subcommittee on Partnerships, Trusts, and
Unincorporated Associations of the Federal Regulation of Securities Committee
in a position paper, Integration, supra note 263. Oregon has recently adopted the
ABA proposal as an integration safe harbor for limited partnership offerings. OR.
ADMIN. R., 815-36-015(3), reprinted in 2 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) ~ 47,634C (Oct.
10, 1982). Oklahoma, in contrast, has expressly adopted the Murphy analysis. See
"Opinion Letter-Limited Partnership-Integration of Offerings," 2 BLUE SKY L.
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the Division to consider adopting a formal position on this issue. 27o
Subsection B(3) prohibits "any form of general solicitation or advertising."27I This provision basically tracks Rule 502(c),272 and reflects one of the requirements of section 11-602(9).273 Rule S-7
contained a similar prohibition. 274 Subsection B(4) imposes a restriction on remuneration paid for solicitation or for sales. 275 Because the
language follows that of Regulation 15.B(3),276 some of the policy questions that arose in that context arise here as well. 277
Subsection B(5) provides that "[s]ecurities acquired in a transaction cannot be resold without registration under the Maryland Securities Act or an exemption therefrom."278 In addition, this provision
requires the issuer to "exercise reasonable care to assure that the purchasers of the securities in any offering under this regulation are
purchasing for investment and not with a view to distribution of the
securities."279 This characterization of securities exempted under Regulation 9 as restricted securities is derived from section 4(2), Rule 146,
and Regulation 0. 280 It also reflects the Division's longstanding policy
toward secondary distributions of nonregistered securities. 281 Subsection B(5) concludes by listing some of the standard techniques by
which the issuer can exercise reasonable care in establishing investment
intent. 282
Both the Limited Offering and General Transactional Exemptions
limit the number of purchasers to whom the exempted securities may
be sold. 283 Subsection B(6) provides a method of calculating the

270.
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.
280.

281.
282.

283.

REP. (CCH) ~ 46,646 (Mar. I, 1982). For an Oklahoma court decision following
the Murphy analysis at the urging of the Oklahoma Securities Commissioner, see
State of Oklahoma ex reI. Marley v. Derdeyn, [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] BLUE
SKY L. REP. (CCH) ~ 71,742 (D. Okla. 1982).
For a sharp critique on the integration doctrine as it has been applied under section 4(2) and Regulation D, see Kripke, supra note 78, at 839-43.
MD. ADMIN. CODE tit. .02, § .02.04.09B(3) (1984).
17 C.F.R. § 230.502(c) (1983).
MD. CORPS. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. § 11-602(9) (Supp. 1984) ("if the securities
have not been offered to the general public by advertisement or general
solicitation").
MD. ADMIN. CODE tit. .02, § .02.03.07C (rescinded 1983).
Id. § .02.04.09B(4) (1984).
Id. § .02.04.15B(3).
See supra text accompanying notes 194-210.
MD. ADMIN. CODE tit. .02, § .02.04.09B(5) (1984).
Id.
See 17 C.P.R. § 230.502(d) (1983), which describes Regulation D securities as
having the status of restricted securities acquired in a transaction under section
4(2).
See Release No.5, supra note 106, at 4, 7.
MD. ADMIN. CODE tit. .02, § .02.04.09B(5)(a)-(d) (1984) (reasonable inquiry as to
purpose of acquisition, restrictive legending, issuance of stop transfer instructions,
and obtaining investment letter). The subsection does not make these the exclusive means of establishing the requisite due diligence.
See infra text accompanying notes 301-09.
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number of purchasers that excludes from the total certain purchasers.
Most notable is the exclusion for accredited investors.284 Also noteworthy is the exclusion of "[a]ny relative, spouse, or relative of the spouse
of a purchaser who has the same principal residence as the purchaser."285 Similar to that exclusion are exclusions for trusts, estates,
corporations, partnerships, and other entities controlled by a purchaser. 286 In addition, subsection B(6)(b) states that a corporation,
partnership, or other entity shall be counted as one purchaser, provided
that the entity is not organized for the sftecific purpose of acquiring the
securities offered under the exemption. 87
Regulation 9's notice filing requirement is contained in subsection
B(7).288 The filing requirement does not apply to all Regulation 9 offerings; instead, it is triggered only when the aggregate offering price
exceeds $100,000. 289 If that figure is exceeded, the issuer must make a
notice filing with the Division not later than fifteen days after the first
sale of securities under the regulation. The issuer must file either a
Form MD_1290 or a document containing the information required by
this form, together with a filing fee. Form MD-l is a short, fill-in-the
blank form containing eighteen items. These items require identification of the issuer and its business; description of the securities being
offered and the manner of the offering; identification of the issuer's officers, directors, general partner, trustees, beneficial owners, and sales
representatives; and a listing of facts which may create a bad boy disqualification. The timely filing of Form MD-l, like the timely filing of
Form D under Regulation 15,291 is a condition of the exemption; the
policy questions about Regulation IS's filing requirement are thus pertinent here as well.
Subsection B(8) makes a standard disclaimer: exemption from registration under Regulation 9 does not provide an exemption from the
Act's antifraud provisions. 292 Exemption from securities registration is
MD. ADMIN. CODE tit .. 02, § .02.04.09B(6)(a)(iv) (1984).
Id. § .02.04.09B(6)(a)(i).
Id. § .02.04.09B(6)(a)(ii)-(iii).
Id. § .02.04.09B(6)(b).
Id. § .02.04.09B(7).
For the definition of aggregate offering price, see id. § .02.04.09A(3).
The Division has taken the position that sales both within and without Maryland must be included in the aggregate offering price. Thus, if the entire offering
exceeds $100,000 a filing must be made in Maryland, even if the aggregate price of
the securities offered in Maryland is less than $100,000. Release No. 24, supra
note 149, at 25,582 (Reg. 09, question 3). Release No. 24 also addresses the definition of aggregate offering'price. Id. (Reg. 09, question 7).
290. Copies of Form MD-l may be obtained from the Division. This filing requirement would not be satisfied through filing the federal Form D used in connection
with a Rule 504 transaction since Form D does not contain all of the information
required by Form MD-1. See Release No. 24, supra note 149, at 25,582 (Reg. 09,
question I).
291. See MD. ADMIN. CODE tit. .02, § .02.04.15B(2) (1984).
292. Id. § .02.04.09B(8).
284.
285.
286.
287.
288.
289.
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not an exemption from securities regulation. Subsection B(9) enumerates certain bad boy disqualifications. 293 This subsection is identical to
Regulation 15.B(4), and serves the same purpose. 294
3.

The Exemptions

a.

The Local Issuer Exemption

Much of the substance of Regulation 9, like that of Regulation D,
can be found in the statements of definitions and conditions. The sections defining the exemptions themselves are relatively succinct. Section C's Local Issuer Exemption contains only four short subsections
imposing conditions additional to those already imposed by section B.
The Rulemaking Committee intended to make section C brief and simple because the Local Issuer Exemption was designed to be a practically self-executing exemption for the small business issuer. It was felt
that these issuers should be able to raise a limited amount of capital
without having to qualify the purchasers, deliver a disclosure document, or make a notice filing. This reduction of regulatory restraint
and compliance costs would, presumably, ease the small business issuer's difficulties with capital formation.
The two-fold task before the Rulemaking Committee, therefore,
was definition of the type of issuer that needed this kind of exemption
and limitation on the size of the offering eligible for this liberal exemption. The solutions proposed by the Rulemaking Committee and
adopted by the Division were essentially ad hoc, and should be regarded as experimenta1. This is an area in which rigorous empirical
analysis of the capital needs and costs of Maryland's small business
issuers may be needed. In any event, the Rulemaking Committee's solutions were expressed in the Local Issuer Exemption of section C.
Subsection C(1) defines the type of small business issuer that may
use the exemption. 295 That subsection provides that exemption under
section C shall be available only to "local issuers," which is defined in
subsection A(6). First, the issuer must be a corporation.2 96 Second, the
corporation must be either organized in Maryland or qualified to do
business in Maryland, and in both cases have its principal place of
business in Maryland. 297 Third, the issuer must reasonably believe that
its securities are held by not more than fifty beneficial owners, both
immediatelis before and immediately after any sale in reliance on this
exemption. 98 These criteria reflect the Rulemaking Committee's belief
293.
294.
295.
296.
297.
298.

Id. § .02.04.09B(9).
See supra text accompanying notes 211-16.
MD. ADMIN. CODE tit. .02, § .02.04.09C(1) (1984).
Id. § .02.04.09A(6)(a).
Id. § .02.04.09A(6)(a)(i).
Id. § .02.04.09A(6)(a)(ii); see also id. § .02.04.09A(6)(b)(i-iii) (explaining how to
calculate the number of beneficial owners). The latter provision allows related
persons, certain institutional investors, and any holder of a purchase money mort-
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that the small, local, corporate enterprise is the type of issuer that needs
this form of regulatory relief and will not pose a significant threat of
abuse. 299
The exclusion of limited partnerships from eligibility does not create a significant disadvantage for those issuers. Most major limited
partnership syndications will proceed under Rules 505 and 506, and
thus will be exempted by coordination under Regulation 15. Others
may be exempted under Regulation 9's more stringent General Transactional Exemption. Although the exclusion does not seriously disadvantage the limited partnership issuer, it may provide a measure of
investor protection, because some state administrators have identified
some limited partnership syndications as particularly abusive.3°O
Subsections C(2) and (3) shift the focus from the issuer to the offering. Subsection C(2) requires that the issuer "reasonably believe
that there are no more than 10 purchasers, wherever located, of securities from the issuer, in any twelve month period, in any offering pursuant to this section."301 Although the 10 purchaser limitation may, at
first glance appear to be too low, that appearance should be dispelled
by recognition of two key facts. First, the issuer may use the General
Transactional Exemption or Regulation 15 for larger offerings. Second, subsection C(2) expressly mandates that the ten purchaser limit be
calculated in accordance with subsection B(6). In sum, related persons,
controlled entities, and accredited investors do not have to be counted
toward the ten purchaser limit. Because subsection A(I)'s definition of
accredited investors includes, among others, certain insiders and
wealthy investors, the number of investors can swell considerably beyond ten. In effect, the Local Issuer Exemption puts a tight ceiling on
the number of ''widows and orphans" to whom the issuer can sell. This
would seem to be an appropriate limitation for this broad exemption,
and it should not pose a great problem for the type of closely held
enterprise for which this exemption was designed. Consistent with this
approach is the $100,000 ceiling on the aggregate offering price established by subsection C(3).302 An issuer with greater capital needs
should be able to use the General Transactional Exemption.
The self-executing character of the Local Issuer Exemption is
brought into sharp relief by subsection C(4), which states simply:

299.

300.
301.
302.

gage to be excluded from the total, and permits corporations and certain other
entities to be counted as single beneficial owners.
The limitation to 50 beneficial owners does not reflect any scientific judgment as
to the identity of the "true" small business issuer. A number on the high side was
recommended by the Rulemaking Committee to give the issuer some flexibility to
grow through successive offerings under the Local Issuer Exemption during the
first few years of operation.
See NASAA Memorandum, supra note 39, at 2-3, 7.
MD. ADMIN. CODE tit. .02, § .02.04.09C(2) (1984).
Id. § .02.04.09C(3): "The aggregate offering price for an offering of securities
under this section in any 12'monlh period may not exceed $100,000." (emphasis
supplied).
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"[a]vailability of the exemption under this section does not depend
upon delivery to any purchaser of any specific disclosure document by
the issuer."303 Although no specific form of disclosure is mandated as a
condition of the exemption, the issuer remains subject to the antifraud
provisions of the Act. In fact, the Local Issuer Exemption may be understood as reliance on the issuer's fear of fraud liability as the major
source of investor protection in these limited offerings.

b.

The General Transactional Exemption

The General Transactional Exemption contained in section D is a
much broader exemption. It imposes no ceiling on the aggregate offering price; the local or nonlocal character of the issuer is irrelevant; it
imposes no limit on the size of the issuer; and it is available to a greater
variety of issuers. Subsection D(l) provides that the exemption may be
used by a corporation, a partnership, or a real estate investment trust
(REITV04 Not all securities issued by these entities, however, may be
exempted under section D. The exemption is available only for the
following securities issued by these entities: "any note, stock, bond,
debenture, evidence of indebtedness, voting trust certificate, share of
beneficial interest of a real estate investment trust, partnership interest,
any warrant or right to purchase or subscribe for a security listed above
or any security convertible into a security listed above."305
This limitation has the effect of excluding investment contracts
from automatic eligibility on the theory that this type of security is
most often used in the more exotic and dubious offerings. 306 Subsection D(l) makes this limitation effective by restricting not only the type
of issuer, but also the type of security that may be covered by the exemption. Accordingly, a corporation or a partnership will have automatic eligibility for an offering of its conventional debt or equity
securities under section D, but not for an investment contract offering.
The Rulemaking Committee and the Division recognized, however,
that not all investment contracts represent a threat to investors, and
that corporations, partnerships, and REITs are not the only legitimate
issuers. Subsection D(l) adds that the "Commissioner may by order
extend the exemption provided by this section to other types of securities and other types of issuers in any case in which he determines that
to do so would not be inconsistent with the public interest."307 The
effect of subsection B(l) is that non-specified issuers have the burden of
seeking this order from the Commissioner.
The General Transactional Exemption also allows the issuer to sell
Id. § .02.04.09C(4).
Id. § .02.04.09D(I).
Id.
State administrators have long emphasized regulation of these forms of investments. See Long, supra note 37, at 543.
307. MD. ADMIN. CODE tit.. 02, § .02.04.09D(I) (1984).

303.
304.
305.
306.
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to more than ten purchasers-thirty-five in this state. 308 Because this
number is also calculated in accordance with subsection B(6), the actual number of purchasers may be significantly greater than thirty-five.
The issuer using this exemption, like the issuer using the Local Issuer
Exemption, need only establish reasonable belief as to the number of
purchasers. Section D then will allow exemption of a fairly substantial
offering, subject only to section D(3)'s disclosure requirements and section B's provision on integration, sales remuneration, investment intent, general solicitation and advertising, and bad boy disqualifications.
In addition, subsection B(7)'s notice filing requirement is triggered only
if the aggregate offering price exceeds $100,000.
Perhaps the most significant aspect of the General Transactional
Exemption (indeed, of Regulation 9 as a whole) is its abandonment of
offeree and purchaser suitability standards. The issuer wishing to rely
on this exemption will not have to satisfy itself that either the offerees
or the purchasers have the sophistication requisite to understanding the
merits of the investment, or that they are capable of bearing the economic risk. The application of subjective suitability standards was long
a problem in section 4(2) and Rule 146 transactions,309 and they created similar problems in Maryland under Rule S_7. 310 The problems
with satisfaction of suitability standards are familiar to all issuer's
counsel. The sophistication requirement was perhaps the most troublesome, since the definition of "sophistication" was enormously elusive.3Il The assessment of risk-bearing ability was perhaps easier to
make,312 but presented a substantial practical problem: the prospective
purchaser might resent the seller's inquiry into his financial status.
These difficulties were compounded by an additional problem; suitability had to be established at the offeree as well as the purchaser level,313
An offer to a single unsuitable person thus might destroy the exemption
for the entire offering,314 a particularly harsh result since an unsuitable
offeree who has not purchased a security has not been harmed.
The Rulemaking Committee acknowledged all of these problems
by excluding from Regulation 9 offeree or purchaser suitability as a
condition of the exemption. 315 Suitability only plays a modest role in
308. Id. § .02.04.09D(2).
309. See generally Soraghan, Private Offerings: Determining "Access," "Investment Sophistication," and "Abr1ity to Bear Economic Risk," 8 SEC. REG. L.J. 3 (1980) (discussing techniques of complying with the suitability requirement); Section 4(2),
supra note 104, at 491-95 (providing guidelines for application of the suitability
standard).
310. MD. ADMIN. CODE tit. .02, § .02.03.07D (rescinded 1983).
311. See Soraghan, supra note 309, at 20-27; Section 4(2), supra note 104, at 492-93.
312. See Soraghan, supra note 309, at 27-34.
313. See MD. ADMIN. CODE tit. .02, § .02.03.07D(l) (rescinded 1983).
314. For evaluation of this possibility under the statutory section 4(2) exemption, see
Section 4(2), supra note 104, at 493-94.
315. q. 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(b)(2)(ii) (1983) (applying a sophistication suitability standard to the 35 nonaccredited investors).
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the General Transactional Exemption's disclosure provisions.
Subsection 0(3) requires the issuer to take one of four options:
(1) delivery of a "Form MO-2, or a disclosure document containing the
information required by this form, to each purchaser prior to any sale
to the purchaser;316 (2) sale only to accredited investors; (3) sale only to
persons whom the issuer reasonably believes are sophisticated investors
or investors with economic risk-bearing ability and a purchaser representative;317 or (4) sale only to a combination of the persons in categories (2) and (3). In essence, the issuer can avoid the question of
suitability by delivering a relatively simple disclosure document to each
purchaser. This should have the effect of encouraging issuers to produce this kind of disclosure. The result could be fewer practical
problems for the issuer, a higher level of blue sky compliance, and
more investor protection318 through timely and meaningful disclosure.
If, however, the issuer using the General Transactional exemption
is able to sell only to accredited or "suitable" inve~tors, it will not have
to deliver a disclosure document as a condition of the exemption; only
the sale319 to a nonaccredited or "unsuitable" investor will trigger the
disclosure requirement. If the issuer is a corporation, it may use Form
MO-2.320 Form MO-2 is a simplified, fill-in-the blank disclosure form.
Although every issuer should rely ~n experienced counsel in completing Form MO-2, the form is designed to help both the seller and the
buyer understand the information being disclosed. It will permit, indeed encourage, the businessperson to take a more active role in the
disclosure process. As a result, it represents a major innovation and a
departure from a tradition of securities regulation that mandates the
production of repetitive, unreadable, and unread boilerplate disclosure.321 Only actual use of the form will determine whether the innovation is successful, but it is intended to make the disclosure process
more meaningful to both the investor and the issuer.
Form MD-2 requires the following specific information: the securities being offered; the use of the offering proceeds; the business of the
316. MD. ADMIN. CODE tit. .02, § .02.04.09D(3)(a)(i) (1984).
317. See id. § .02.04.09A(8) (defining purchaser representative).
318. Rule S-7 (1974) contained no disclosure requirement, but required the issuer's
reasonable belief in both offeree and purchaser suitability. MD. ADMIN. CODE tit.
.02, § .02.03.07D (rescinded 1983).
319. Only the purchaser's suitability is relevant to this requirement. See supra text accompanying notes 316-17.
320. Copies of Form MD-2 may be obtained from the Division.
321. For a critique of the SEC's disclosure system, see H. KRIPKE, THE SEC AND CORPORATE DISCLOSURE: REGULATION IN SEARCH OF A PURPOSE (1979); see also R.
KARMEL, REGULATION By PROSECUTION: THE SEC V. CORPORATE AMERICA
(1982). For an important, recent reevaluation of these and other critiques of federal disclosure policy, see Seligman, The Historical Need for a Mandatory Corporate Disclosure System, 9 J. CORP. L. 1 (1983); see also Sargent, Book Review, 12
U. BALT. L. REV. 371 (1982) (reviewing R. KARMEL, supra, and J. SELIGMAN, THE
TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET (1982».
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issuer; the risk factors associated with the business; the organizational
history of the issuer; the identity and remuneration of persons selling
the securities; the identity and background of the managers and owners
of the issuer; possible conflicts of interest; remuneration of management; recent distributions by the issuer; recent securities issuances; the
terms of payment for the securities being offered; the expiration date of
the offering; prior issuance of securities to insiders at a price lower than
the offering price; and the terms of any escrow of the proceeds of the
offering. In addition to the foregoing, Item 19 of Form MD-2 requires
the issuer, as a condition of the exemption, to provide various forms of
financial data. The amount and type of financial disclosure varies with
the length of time the issuer has been in operation and the availability
of certified financial statements. 322
As mentioned above, only corporations may use Form MD-2.
Limited partnerships and other issuers are currently required to fashion
a disclosure document that will provide equivalent information in an
appropriate form. These documents need not track Form MD-2's fillin-the-blank format. The Division plans to publish a form for use by
limited partnerships after a period of experimentation with Form MD2.

Although the use of Form MD-2 or its equivalent is unnecessary
when the issuer sells only to accredited or sophisticated investors, subsection D(2)(b)323 requires another form of disclosure to all investors
whenever the issuer has previously issued "cheap stock" (stock sold at a
price twenty-five percent lower than the offering price) to insiders 324 or
does not intend to escrow the entire proceeds of the offering until completion of the offering. 325 In essence, the issuer is required specially to
disclose to all investors the existence of this cheap stock or the lack of
escrow. Part II of Form MD-2 may be used for that purpose. 326 These
special disclosure requirements reflect the risks to investors that sometimes arise when the proceeds of the offering may be used before the
offering is completed, and when the insiders have paid less for their
equity position than the outside investors. 327
These provisions do not represent a movement of the Division toward merit regulation. Although cheap stock is a traditional merit con322. See Form MD-2, Item 19 (copy available from the Division).
323. MD. ADMIN. CODE tit ..02, § .02.04.09D(3)(b)(i) (1984).
324. The category of insiders consists of officers, directors, general partners, and promoters of the issuer. Id. § .02.04.09D(2)(b)(i).
325. Id. § .02.04.09(3)(b)(ii).
326. Form MD-2, Part II will allow simple, short form disclosure of either of those two
facts.
327. For an explanation of why cheap stock provisions are applied by merit regulators
in the context of a registered offering, see Goodkind, Blue Sky Law: Is There
Merit in the Merit Requirements?, 1976 WIS. L. REV. 79, 90-93; Hueni, Application
0/ Merit Requirements in State Securities Regulation, 15 WAYNE L. REV. 1417,
1423-28 (1969); Tyler, More About Blue Sky, 39 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 899, 912-13
(1982).
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cern, subsection D(2)(b) merely imposes a special disclosure
requirement,328 one that tempers the liberality of this exemption without imposing a substantial compliance burden upon the issuer.
4.

Limits on the Applicability of Regulation 9

Regulation 9 ends with a simple statement of its scope. Subsection
E(1)329 provides that the exemption is not available to any offering registered under the 1933 Act or exempted under Regulation A. Both
types of offering, of course, may be registered by coordination. Subsection E(2)330 declares the unavailability of Regulation 9 for Rule 505
and 506 offerings, both of which may be exempted by coordination
under Regulation 15.
VI.

CONCLUSION

It is perhaps too early to judge the effectiveness of the current
Maryland exemptive regime. In any event, no conclusions can be
drawn without empirical analysis of use, compliance, costs, and patterns of fraudulent activity.331 The Maryland experience as a whole,
328. A comparison of the cheap stock provision of Reg. 9 and the cheap stock restrictions recommended by NASAA for lise by merit states in connection with registered public offerings will make this distinction clear. See NASAA Statement of
Policy on Cheap Stock, I BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) ~ 5312 (Apr. 23, 1983).
329. MD. ADMIN. CODE tit. .02, § .02.04.09E(l) (1984).
330. Id. § .02.04.09E(2).
331. The SEC has been criticized for its failure to "publish any study concerning the
incidence of fraud among issuers employing the small issue and private placement
exemptions." Seligman, supra note 321, at 60. Seligman adds:
[T]he statutory responsibility of the SEC in administering the 1933
Securities Act is to protect investors. To so substantially expand the
small business exemptions without publication of any analysis of the
problem this may create for investors represents an ignorance of this
mandate and of the problems that led to the passage of the 1933 Securities Act.
Id. at 60-61 (citations omitted). Empirical study of patterns of fraudulent activity
should also be conducted at the state level. This is especially necessary in light of
the heavy use of Reg. 9 and Reg. 15. Between July I, 1982 and December 15,
1983, approximately 1,500 Reg. 15 notice filings were made with the Division,
used in connection with offerings totaling more than $11.5 billion. In the same
period, 135 Reg. 9 notice filings were made, used in connection with offerings
totaling more than $114 million. Release No. 24, supra note 149, at 25,582. If the
extensive use of Regulation D and parallel state exemptions can be shown to have
caused an increase in securities fraud, then the premises of the exemptive system
will have to be rethought. Particular attention will have to be focused on the
effects of the reduction or elimination of specific disclosure requirements, the
deemphasis of purchaser sophistication requirements, the SEC's deferral to state
regulation in the context of Rule 504 offerings, the dramatic increase in dollar
ceilings on the aggregate offering price, the presumption of suitability for certain
accredited investors, and the extensive use of these exemptions by tax advantaged
syndications rather than small corporate issuers. Although this article has operated under the assumption that the changes in the federal and state law represent
a needed rationalization and expansion of the exemptive schemes, it must be cautioned that the results of these experiments should be closely monitored.

19841

Offering Exemptions

557

however, may contain some lessons for the treatment of limited and
private offerings in every state. For example, the principle of exemption by coordination reflects one key technique of reducing securities
compliance costs: reduction of duplicative or unnecessarily inconsistent
state regulation. Application of this principle may require the state to
abandon some of their traditional restraints on these exemptions; the
Maryland experiment may demonstrate that some of these restraints
were not only costly, but relatively unimportant from an investor protection standpoint.
Similarly, the Maryland experience may demonstrate the value of
flexibility. Regulation 9 sets very specific limits on the number of purchasers and the number of beneficial owners of local issuers, imposes
clear restrictions on sales remuneration, and requires specific disclosure
to nonaccredited investors and investors who do not meet suitability
standards. In all of these cases, however, the issuer need only establish
its reasonable belief as to compliance-a valuable counterweight to the
threat of strict liability that would result from failure to satisfy all the
conditions of the exemption. The same kind of flexibility is implicit in
the special order mechanisms, which give the issuer the opportunity to
persuade the Commissioner to issue an exemptive order on the basis of
a good faith effort to comply, or to extend eligibility for the General
Transactional Exemption to issuers not specifically covered by that exemption. Bright lines, strict standards, and absolute limits may produce predictability, but they do not always allow the law to
accommodate the dynamic and unexpected character of capital formation. The element of flexibility built into the Maryland rules may do
so.
Finally, the Maryland experience reflects the need to experiment
with different means of balancing the needs of capital formation and
investor protection. There is no single way to protect investors; their
needs vary with the nature of the investor, the type of security, the size
of the offering, the identity of the salespersons, the manner of the offering, and the nature of the issuer. Their needs may be met by treating
different issuers and securities differently, by imposing different disclosure requirements under different circumstances, and by requiring
some kinds of offerings to satisfy more exemptive conditions. The crux,
however, is that not every exemptive condition and every technique of
investor protection should apply to every transaction. In some contexts, a particular condition may not only be burdensome to the issuer,
but relatively useless to the investor. In others, the condition may be
very useful and its burdensome aspects justifiable. Only experimentation, empirical analysis of the incidence of fraud and investor abuse in
exempt transactions, and open minds will make the right choices
possible.

